European Union Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria
Component 1

MID-TERM PROJECT INTERNAL EVALUATION REPORT

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<tr>
<td>BRIDGE</td>
<td>Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CVE</td>
<td>Civic and Voter Education</td>
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<td>CVR</td>
<td>Continuous Voter Registration</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECES</td>
<td>European Centre for Electoral Support</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECONEC</td>
<td>ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EEM</td>
<td>European Expert Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFM</td>
<td>Electoral Follow-up Mission</td>
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<td>EMB</td>
<td>Electoral Management Body</td>
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<td>EMS</td>
<td>Election Management System</td>
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<td>EMSC</td>
<td>Election Management and Support Centre</td>
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<td>EOM</td>
<td>Election Observation Mission</td>
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<td>EPM</td>
<td>Enterprise Project Management</td>
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<td>EPP</td>
<td>Election Project Plan</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUD</td>
<td>European Union Delegation</td>
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<td>EUSDGN</td>
<td>European Union Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria</td>
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<td>FCT</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory</td>
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<td>FOSIECON</td>
<td>Forum of State Independent Electoral Commissions of Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Head Quarter</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resource</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Electoral Systems</td>
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<td>IMS</td>
<td>Institute for Media and Society</td>
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<td>INEC</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>IPC</td>
<td>International Press Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEAD</td>
<td>Leadership and conflict management skills for Electoral Stakeholders</td>
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<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>NIPSS</td>
<td>National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NWTF</td>
<td>National Women’s Trust Fund</td>
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<td>NYSC</td>
<td>National Youth Service Corp</td>
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<td>PRODOC</td>
<td>Project Document</td>
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<td>PMU</td>
<td>Project Management Unit</td>
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<td>PTC</td>
<td>Project Technical Committee</td>
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<td>PVC</td>
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<td>RMBs</td>
<td>Results-Based Monitoring</td>
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<td>SIEC</td>
<td>State Independent Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>SWOT</td>
<td>Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities and Threats</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>YIAGA</td>
<td>Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The European Union / Support to the Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EUSDGN), launched in 2017, is a five-year long project funded by the European Development Fund (EDF) with a budget of 26.5 million euro which aims at strengthening Nigerian democratic institutions and the electoral process. The project comprises five components that cover institutional capacity building of local stakeholders involved in democratic governance: electoral bodies, national assembly, political parties, media and Civil Society Organizations (CSO). The European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES) was awarded a grant contract for implementation of component 1, which deals with the institutional performance of Nigerian electoral bodies, with a budget of 13 million euro, to which ECES has added a contribution of 650,000 euros from its core funds.

While the European Union Delegation to Nigeria (EUD) foresees a mid-term evaluation of the entire EUSDGN project, the present evaluation concerns solely component 1 in compliance with the contract between the EU and ECES.

This evaluation covers the period June 2017-February 2020 and is based on the six OECD/DAC criteria (relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability), supplemented by a specific criterion on EU/ECES added value. It has been guided by an evaluation matrix approved at the inception of the work. All interviews were conducted by means of teleconference.

This EU project builds on previous EU funded interventions toward a credible and robust electoral environment in Nigeria and borrows certain activities from past projects while ECES has brought in some innovations. It is undoubtedly based on a substantial analysis of the context, particularly the findings of the 2015 EU EOM. Since its inception, a continuous collaboration among all the stakeholders and the commitment of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) have ensured adequacy between the requests of the INEC and the activities which have been implemented.

While the EU funded programme is currently the largest international election support in Nigeria, there are other on-going projects funded by different donors. No clear overlaps or contradictory initiatives were noted. Regular meetings ensure information exchange and coordination, leading in some instances to a collaboration between ECES and partners to implement activities.

The design of the EUSDGN and its implementation mechanisms provide a strong basis for coherence among activities conducted within the different components. The implementers of those components meet regularly under the EU delegation leadership and in topic-based clusters. Some outreach activities have been conducted jointly. This is particularly relevant since different components of EUSDGN call for the engagement of the same stakeholders.

However, such collaboration should not blur the lines between enhancement of INEC’s institutional capacities, which fall under component 1, and activities that intend to enhance awareness on various topics. It was noted that under the output which deals with internal communication and engagement with stakeholders, some activities which pertain to INEC’s capacities enhancement have not yet been implemented while the programme implementation has emphasized those activities that reverted directly to stakeholders. Along the lines of the 2017 EU EFM report which recalls that there is a “need for long-term support to INEC for human resources capacity building”, a stronger focus could be given to the internal enhancement of INEC capabilities. The same goes for activities that deal with enhancing INEC internal communication.
ECES has conducted since the inception of the project an impressive array of activities, particularly trainings, after a relatively slow start and despite a four-month period following the 2019 general elections where INEC was busy with post-elections tasks and during which the project’s workplan was updated. ECES is widely perceived as responding to requests with reactivity and flexibility. However, it is noted that no activity was conducted, until very recently, under output 3 which covers voter registration. Regarding the few other activities included in the workplan which are yet to be implemented, particular attention should be paid to those which consist of needs assessments and baselines studies. By nature, they would provide a stronger basis to enhance the effectiveness and impact of trainings.

After the 2019 general elections an updated workplan was agreed. However, the INEC report on these elections, when finalized, should be considered to further re-assess the workplan. Moreover, the 2019 EU EOM and the 2017 EFM have identified some gaps which are closely related to areas where ECES has already intervened. This is notably the case of INEC’s communication policy, INEC’s internal capacities, election management and voter participation.

In general terms, the 2019 EU EOM has noted that progress, compared to the previous general elections, remains limited. This does not mean that in some domain the project has not had already an impact, as illustrated by the transformation of the EMS into an EMSC, the establishment of a media monitoring centre, the strengthening of the law library of the Commission, and the conduct of innovative outreach campaigns targeting key groups.

The remaining two years of the project, which are free of major elections, could be used to focus on the identified gaps. With the elections behind, these two years offer the opportunity to deepen the analysis of the root-cause of some of the deficiencies and orientate the activities accordingly. The emphasis should be on building the capacities of INEC to address these challenges with the transformative impact and the sustainability of the project’s activities as determining criteria.

The provision of high-level expertise to INEC is a feature of the project which is the continuation of an action already undertaken within the previous EU funded interventions. This concerns at least both the technical team to the chairmanship of the Commission and the expert hired for the establishment and operationalization of the EMSC. This enables to bring in, with immediate effect, the desired expertise.

However, there is no immediate measurable evidence that these modalities of seconding a technical team provide an effective consolidation of the INEC. Regarding the EMSC, it was noted that it remains under the leadership of the senior adviser to the INEC Chair and the expert, with little buy-in by the different directorates. Regarding the technical team, grey areas from the perspectives of accountability and definition of roles were noted. More importantly, the conclusions reached at the end of the previous project, highlighting the “limited sustainability and buy-in from civil service staff for restructuring and institutionalising changes”, remain valid. For the remaining two years, the project could focus on a more regular documentation of the contribution of the technical team to enhancing the efficiency of the INEC and on ways to ensure the institutional integration of this expertise within the INEC.

Regarding the financial management of the project, there are several factors which are conducive to efficiency. It was noted that while being an implementer, ECES is also a contributor and therefore shares an interest in the sound management of the project. Monitoring of ECES’ activities is a permanent stock-taking and forward-looking exercise for adjusting ECES’ intervention logic and activities, drawing lessons against the ECES expected outputs and outcomes. Regular coordination with implementers of other components of the EUSDGN appears to provide a
reasonable means to identify gaps and overlaps and ensure an efficient use of resources. Additionally, component 1 has been submitted in 2018 to a financial audit by an external firm and its recommendations for improvement have been addressed.

The evaluation noted as well a high turnover rate regarding both the project coordinators and the staff itself and an important involvement of ECES headquarters in the implementation of the project, as foreseen in the ECES’ Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).

In this context the project would benefit from a more robust field management and the ongoing selection of a new project coordinator will be key to address those managerial issues.

ECES informed that they have submitted to the EU Delegation an important number of CVs from its roster and a specific open call for experts for the selection of the project coordinator. ECES made recommendations to the EU Delegation of the profile they intend to select for the project coordination and the project management set up they have arranged taking on board their 10 years specific experiences in implementing EU funded electoral assistance projects and the results of the verification of expenditures, external audit, internal monitoring and evaluation exercises they carried out for the component 1 of the EUSDGN. The selection process is ongoing, The EU Delegation provided relevant feedback that ECES is implementing.

ECES explained that the usual role of its HQ is a mechanism needed to make sure that EU project management rules are respected and this implies the selection of project coordinators with previous EU project and financial management experience that is not always found in senior electoral experts as shown as well in the EUSDGN project in two of the three project coordinators selected.

ECES’ feedback indicates that their working modality requires an important supervisory role of their HQ. This is explained in their SOP and confirmed by the recent ISO 9001 certification on quality management and TRACE certification for transparency and disclosure on their financial management. ECES noted that this framework which was also communicated to the contracting authority as a means of implementation in the project document, is the practice in all ECES implemented projects which ensures properly executed and documented financial management procedures.

The present internal evaluation, at mid-term of the implementation of the project, allows to make some recommendations for the remaining two years till June 2022. Among these, five could receive the highest priority. They concern the reinforcement of ECES local management, the adjustment of the project workplan based on the 2019 general elections assessment, efforts to better embed into the INEC the contribution of the technical team, prioritizing activities directly related to INEC’s institutional ownership, self-confidence and professionalism and ensuring that cross-cutting activities with other components of EUSDGN enhance the capacity of INEC to conduct such activities autonomously.
II – INTRODUCTION

The European Union / Support to the Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EUSDGN) is a cooperation project funded by the EDF with a budget of 26.5 million euro. It was launched in 2017 with an implementation timeframe valid till 2022.

The EUSDGN is an initiative to address electoral gaps identified and highlighted during the 2015 General Elections and during the formulation mission to Nigeria and the 2017 Electoral Follow-up Mission to Nigeria (EFM). Among other aspects, the 2015 EU Electoral Observation Mission (EUEOM) provided a road map with prioritised recommendations. Therefore, the project is built upon such baselines and intends to reflect relevant goals in a long-term electoral assistance framework.

The project comprises five pillars, called components, which cover institutional capacity building of local stakeholders involved in democratic governance, that is, electoral bodies, national assembly, political parties, media and CSOs. A broad array of actions foreseen included staff training, equipment support, decision-making improvements and awareness raising on compliance with international standards.

The European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES) was awarded a grant contract for implementation of component 1 - “Support to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)”, with a budget of 13 million euro, to which ECES has added a contribution of 650 000 euros from its core funds.

Component 1 deals with the institutional performance of Nigerian electoral bodies and more specifically aims at strengthening the strategic planning, policy framework and operational capacity and systems of INEC. Six specific outputs address sensitive aspects such as INEC internal planning and accountability, voter registration mechanisms, political parties oversight, electoral dispute resolutions, electoral offences, outreach strategies and support to Forum of States Independent Electoral Commissions (FOSIECON).

While the European Union Delegation to Nigeria (EUD) foresees a mid-term evaluation of the EUSDGN project as a whole, the contract between the EU and ECES stipulates that a specific mid-term evaluation of component 1 will be conducted. This evaluation serves as an early alert mechanism and provides an opportunity to make recommendations at a time when modifications and further improvements are still feasible and can be implemented during the second half of the project. Based on findings retrieved during the evaluation, a set of measures would be taken and the final performance of the project would be improved. Moreover, the evaluation takes place as a piece of an overall Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) schema that aims at identifying potential gaps at early stages and facilitating mitigation strategies accordingly.

III – METHODOLOGY

3.1 Scope and approach

The methodological framework which served as the basis for the evaluation is defined in the Terms of Reference (see Annex 1). Within the scope thereby defined, the evaluators have particularly paid attention to the following elements.
Firstly, since this is a mid-term evaluation, **analysis is focused on the process, progresses and mid-term expected results** at this stage as opposed to a final evaluation. Moreover, it is referred to the intermediate impact as defined in the intervention logic of the EUSDGN project. Consideration was also given to the fact that the current evaluation must, among others, help to redefine / eventually propose reorientation(s) of some activities for the remaining duration of the project. The time factor has also included consideration of the Nigerian electoral calendar, since the first two years of the project implementation did coincide with the preparation and conduct of the 2019 General and State elections.

Secondly, **the analysis conducted for each criterion has been matched to the expected outcomes of the EUSDGN component 1**, as established in the intervention logic of the project. Particular attention is paid to the effective contribution, or lack of, of the component 1’s activities to the achievement of these expected outcomes. The analysis tries, as much as possible, to make bridges with other EU SDGN components, notably with respect to recommendations for the final two years of the project.

Thirdly, **the evaluation addresses learning as well as accountability objectives**. This evaluation duly takes into account that the ECES actions were strongly embedded in and influenced by the country context. The study looked closely at the evolving landscape of Nigeria’s electoral processes since 2015. The evaluation team has applied an approach that seeks to analyse the extent to which results have been reached as well as the reasons and determining factors behind the observed successes and failures. This evaluation approach was also based on an examination of ECES processes and focused on reviewing changes/developments and trends, rather than assessing only achievements against fixed targets.

**The mid-term evaluation was conducted in three main phases**: (i) inception phase with an analysis carried out during the collection of the documentation; (ii) a remote field phase, including continuing data collection and comprehensive stakeholders consultation by remote communication tools; and (iii) a synthesis phase, including the aggregation and analysis of data and preparation of the final report. The final report is the results of those phases.

### 3.2 Reconstruction of the intervention logic

The first task of the inception phase consisted of **situating component 1 within the reconstructed intervention logic** (IL) of the whole EU-SDGN project (annex 4) underlying the hierarchy of the objectives of the EU actions to support electoral processes. The IL provided a synthetic representation of the Theory of Change (ToC), as follows:

- enhancement of key stakeholders’ capacities;
- enhancement of public confidence in electoral processes;
- establishment of an enabling and inclusive electoral environment;
- enhancement of women, youth and PWDs participation;
- enhancement of dialogue activities and information sharing among key players.

An **evaluation matrix** (annex 3) was drafted as a main analytical guideline. Based on EU-SDGN outcomes and outputs related to component 1 of the overall project, **evaluation questions (EQs)** and indicators have been established conforming to the OECD/DAC criteria (relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability), supplemented by a

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1 The ECES proposal was drafted after the EU EOM 2015
specific criterion on EU/ECES added value. Moreover, value for money and cross-cutting issues have also been taken into consideration and related indicators have been incorporated within the six OECD/DAC patterns.

Table 1: Evaluation questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EQ</th>
<th>Question</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ1</td>
<td>Relevance To what extent the intervention objectives and design respond to beneficiaries’, global, country, and partner/institution needs, policies, and priorities, and continue to do so if circumstances change?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ2</td>
<td>Coherence To what extent compatibility (i.e. complementarity, consistency and coordination) exists with other activities in a given country, sector or institution?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ3</td>
<td>Effectiveness To what extent has the intervention achieved its intermediary results and contributed to improving INEC’s management of the 2019 elections? To what extent has it contributed to fostering INEC’s capacities towards its stakeholders, voters, political parties?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ4</td>
<td>Efficiency To what extent the intervention delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in a cost-efficient and timely way? To what extent value for money is applied?</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQ5</td>
<td>Impact To what extent the ECES support to INEC has already brought some changes which can be measured against the 2019 elections?</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQ6</td>
<td>Sustainability To what extent the actions are bringing transformations which are likely to be upheld without donor’s support?</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQ7</td>
<td>EU/ECES added value To what extent the Action brings additional benefits to what would have resulted from Member States’ interventions only in the partner country / To what extent ECES involvement represents an improvement compared to previous and current implementers?</td>
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</table>

The evaluation matrix and these evaluation questions were accepted by the ECES and correspond to the areas outlined in the terms of reference.

3.3. Tools and methods

Once the evaluation matrix was agreed, the evaluators proceeded with semi-structured interviews (list of people interviewed attached – annex 5) and consulted additional documents as deemed necessary based on the EQs, the proposed means of verification and the outcomes of interviews. Due the COVID-19 situation, all interviews were remotely conducted, by means of teleconference.

The interviewees include representatives from the INEC (National Commissioners, Directors, staff, advisers), the EU Delegation to Nigeria, the implementing organisations of components 2 to 5 of the EUSDGN, electoral experts involved in EU missions and ECES. In total, evaluators consulted 38 stakeholders.

Regarding data analysis, more than 50 documents were reviewed (see annex 6). They include:
- EU National Indicative Programme for Nigeria
• ECES Projects documents (annual work plans, ECES annual narrative reports, pre and post elections reports, EUSDGN minutes, INEC 3 adviser reports etc.)
• Monitoring & Evaluation reports
• EU Election Observation Mission reports
• INEC reports

3.4 Challenges and limitations

The evaluators faced a number of challenges and limitations with regard to the collection and analysis of data and information. These include the following:
• The evaluation covers only one component of a wider project. Despite mechanisms intended to build an integrated approach and common work plans among EUSDGN components, interviews and documentation gave mostly a vertical vision of the action.
• It was not possible to interview EU stakeholders at headquarters’ level.
• The sanitary situation at the time of the evaluation did not allow a field visit.

Given the limitations, a few provisions and measures have been considered, as shown in table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges and limitations</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capture and analyse the intervention logic of the whole EU SDGN programme going beyond component-based approaches</td>
<td>Interview of representatives of implementing partners of all other components of EUSDGN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Underlying documents and outputs conceived for the duration of the project</td>
<td>Particular attention was paid to the action’s work plan / conclusions and recommendations oriented for the remaining time of the project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of interviews of EU stakeholders at HQ level</td>
<td>Triangulation of sources with ECES beneficiaries, ECES staff and INEC advisers</td>
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<td>Remote work</td>
<td>Intensive use of electronic communication tools and planning flexibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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IV – ANSWERED QUESTIONS / FINDINGS

1 – Relevance

EQ1: To what extent the intervention objectives and design respond to beneficiaries’, global, country, and partner/institution needs, policies, and priorities, and continue to do so if circumstances change?

Relevance is an indicator that intends to assess to what extent a given action matches what is needed by its alleged beneficiaries. Such assessment takes into consideration beneficiaries together with the context within which their actions are implemented. Moreover, a sound identification process is needed for determining which needs exist, which actions are required and which process is appropriate to address all challenges. The project structuration is crucial for achieving all expected outcomes.

In this regard, relevance might not be met due to different pitfalls. Planning could have been biased and therefore misleading activities would not address actual challenges. Such mismatch might have different grounds, such as a very basic divergence between program goals and beneficiaries’ and/or contextual needs, but also other more nuanced gaps. Accordingly, the program should be based on a realistic understanding of existing capacities. Otherwise, a well-intended action will have low impact since local stakeholders would not be able to benefit from it. The intervention logic would have failed due to activities that would not be aligned to what INEC and Nigeria are really able to assume. Finally, partners’ commitment is a key factor as well. Given a plan addressed to actual needs and tailored to local capabilities, partners could refrain from being involved due to other factors, such as the social context, other stronger incentives being in place or even the credibility of the donor itself based on its past projects. The design and focus of the actions are firmly aligned with and INEC Nigerian’s strategic priorities.

The provision of the ECES actions over the period 2017-2020 was highly relevant to INEC’s electoral needs and the evolving context in Nigeria. The EUSDG Programme was established taking into consideration the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) drafted recommendations that aimed at improving the election process, what comprises election administration, and a needs identification report was also produced by the European Commission. Consequently, in 2016 conversations between INEC and the EU Delegation (EUD) led to an agreement for a development programme covering five different areas. Component 1 deals with INEC’s institutional capacity. Such previous approaches

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2 Final Report. Federal Republic of Nigeria, European Union Electoral Observation Mission. Among other considerations, this report highlights that “INEC has gained credibility since the appointment of the new Chairperson in 2010, however it is not clear to what extent the institution has been reformed. During the 2015 elections INEC appears to have performed impartially in challenging circumstances, although criticism increased following both election days. However, given the insufficient requirements for transparency and full public accountability as well as a lack of full institutional independence, the election administration remains vulnerable to partisan operations and/or weak delivery that risks exploitation by parties” (: 4). Therefore, EU programmes that intend to address such weaknesses, such the EUSDG one and its component 1 in particular, seems well aligned to what had already been spotted by the election observation mission. The EUSDG programme is built upon such basecamp.

prove that the project was built upon an overall understanding of what INEC needed and could do at that moment. Moreover, the EU evaluation of the previous UNDP development program has also been considered for this conceptualisation phase. It provides a useful retrospective analysis with lessons learned and recommendations for further development programmes.

In this regard, ECES deployed formulation missions in 2016 and early 2017, that is before the project real kick-off in June 2017. Such initiatives reflect that the program was conceived to take into consideration local needs and hence such a formulation is elaborated on the field and not just based on desk reviews.

Moreover, the first ECES report (end 2017) intended to make even more clear what the purposes of the project were and how it complied with local needs. In this regard, the document contextualises the action within a specific social and political environment. It also undertakes an explicit comparison between 2015 EU EOM recommendations and every action of the EU SDGN Component 1. That exercise is crucial so as to fine tune the EU SDGN implementation to the expected goals highlighted by EU EOM and EU formulation/identification.

As a final effort to properly capture the environment where the project is implemented and to update the intervention logic of the project, ECES has also completed a contextual report on the impact of violence and associated factors on Nigeria’s elections. Although delivered in April 2020, an Electoral Political Economy Analysis (EPEA) is a key tool for a real tailoring of a development program as long as it enables a detailed familiarisation with what really matters in a given country. This EPEA could be a useful reference for stakeholders in the next electoral cycle, 2019 – 2023.

**The structuration of the project responds to real needs and enhances a meaningful intervention logic for the international development programme**

Beyond the conceptualisation tasks already mentioned above, the EUSDGN programme relies upon five pillars and different local as well as international stakeholders are actively involved

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4 IBF, Final Evaluation of the “Support to the Nigerian Electoral Cycle 2012-2015” and “EU Additional Support to Nigeria Electoral Cycle 2011-2015” Projects, The European Union’s FED Programme for Nigeria. The document insists in “INEC needs to develop, train in, and institutionalize an efficient, effective system for administering elections and political processes in Nigeria that is able to deliver credible elections and encourage the growth of and competition between democratic political parties. While the current system managed to administer the 2015 general elections, no one should be satisfied with this level of capacity, competence, and results” (: 14-15).

5 As recalled by the Monitoring Report / Year 1, “on 2016, ECES has conducted no less than three identification and formulation missions, financed on ECES Core Funds for finalising the Project Document (ProdDoc). During these missions the ECES team met with all the electoral stakeholders … to ensure that all the proposed ProdDoc activities would be in line with the needs and requests of INEC. ECES met with all the other International NGOs … to ensure that the activities would be not overlap with already existing support to INEC and will create synergies with the potential partners of EU-SDGN programme” (: 1). See also the ECES Inception Report (: 4).

6 Inception Report and Analysis of the Political and Electoral Context in Nigeria. The document also provides an analysis of the political background, draws conclusions from 2015 general elections and highlights issues related to the upcoming Anambra elections.

7 It aimed “at providing to the EU Delegation a first analysis of the implementation of the 2015 European Union Electoral Observation Mission (EU-EOM) recommendations in view of the upcoming European Union Electoral Follow up Mission (EFM) in Nigeria” (: 4). Taking into consideration 30 recommendations, the report warned, for instance, that “25 require legislative action, including amendment to the Constitution (8); amendments of current primary legislation, that is, the Electoral Act (11); and incorporation into the primary legislation (6)” (: 81).

8 Stakeholders are Policy and Advocacy Centre (PLAC), Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement (YIAGA) [Component 2], National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) [Component 3], Institute for Media
in their implementation. ECES is in charge of component 1, which deals with INEC needs. ECES also serves as secretariat for the whole package.

ECES opened an office in Abuja in 2017 and recruited both national and international staff that comprised a Project Director and experts on different electoral and administrative topics. The working plan was agreed and the implementation started in June 2017\(^9\). In terms of operational mechanisms, a EUSDGN Project Technical Committee (PTC) meets on a regular basis, thereby enhancing a coordination strategy among stakeholders involved in the programme’s implementation\(^10\). INEC’s representatives, the EUD and partners in charge of different components, among which ECES as implementer of component 1, attend these meetings.

Such meetings play a crucial role throughout the whole implementation period. Unexpected gaps could be early detected and mitigation measures adopted within the EU SDGN programme. Both the intervention logic and working plan is fine-tuned accordingly.

**Nigerian stakeholders are committed to a successful implementation of the project by undertaking joint activities and mobilising targeted audiences.**

The evaluation has also confirmed that stakeholders were fully committed and contributed to a successful implementation of the EUSDGN component 1. Firstly, INEC itself facilitates activities and worked together with the ECES team\(^11\). Secondly, having in mind that activities also targeted other local actors, such as civil society organisations or State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs) through FOSIECON, both interviews and written documentation reflect that actions were well perceived\(^12\). A significant number of people\(^13\) belonging to a broad array of stakeholders, ranging from students in universities to Persons With Disabilities, attended the meetings and benefitted from the programme.

Although just the attendance to a meeting is not significant enough for a definitive assessment on relevance, it is to note that such quantitative parameter may at least reflect the commitment of the targeted audience in terms of mobilisation. Needless to say, the ECES intervention logic and the relevance as a general criterion would also need other indicators to complete the assessment.

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9 See Inception Report (: 4)
10 Detailed minutes of these meetings are available and have been consulted by the evaluators.
11 There is a constant interaction between ECES team and INEC staff that results in a joint conceptualization of activities. INEC inputs vary depending on the activity’s profile, but, in general terms, INEC staff may contribute as experts for outreach actions, facilitate logistics or provide inputs to updated policies. Moreover, the technical team of three advisors plays an important role establishing a bridge between INEC and ECES.
12 It is the case of sensitization actions that targeted different groups, such as youth, Persons With Albinism or women. The Albino Foundation, which is a EUSDGN partner too, appreciated ECES contribution to activities undertaken within the program. Youth campuses were also praised by all interlocutors and by the EUD itself in particular. Regarding FOSIECON, training seminars and peer exchanges contributed to a higher commitment of all electoral stakeholders in Nigeria.
13 Monitoring reports include detailed breakdowns that facilitate such assessment. In year two, for instance, 1161 individuals benefitted from activities undertaken under output 1; 12169 for output 2, which comprises most of outreach actions; 222 for output 4, which deals with political parties; 1339 for output 5 that works on new legal procedures and finally six people under output 6, which intends to enhance State Electoral authorities.
Conditions exist for a full completion of the project during the remaining implementation period though a definitive re-evaluation of evolving needs is necessary

Regarding the tasks to be completed during the second half of the programme, the work plan as well as the ECES yearly narrative reports available so far (till June 2019) highlight pending activities and establish a calendar for their implementation. Both the timeframe, which still gives a 2-year window, and the social context, with no general elections during this period, should allow for a smooth completion of the initial plan that would consolidate achievements and pave the way for future improvements.

Having noted different positive parameters, the programme’s overall role should be taken into consideration. Its second half is to be used as a finalisation period where activities and targets are completed as intended, but it is also worth having in mind what the needs would be in the aftermath. In other words, the programme should be conceived as a piece of a continuous international effort towards a credible and robust electoral environment in Nigeria. Therefore, activities for the second period are meant to facilitate a subsequent development programme to be built upon recommendations of the current one. Such general approach would be reflected in how INEC’s needs, capacities and stakeholders’ commitment are assessed and addressed.

Firstly, after the 2019 General Elections, a reassessment of INEC’s needs was necessary. In this regard, it is to note that ECES intervention logic already took into consideration such evolving contexts, which are not rare when dealing with electoral matters.

Regarding the EU approach, attention should be paid to the 2019 EU EOM Final Report where a set of prioritised recommendations are established. Moreover, analogous inputs may be retrieved from other local stakeholders, such as the domestic observation network, or from international missions. All these documents provide a general picture of what happened, with positive notes and main pitfalls. Therefore, all these documents should be used as guidelines for the second half of EUSDGN programme. According to ECES intervention logic and conclusions drawn from an evolving context, an updated working plan benefits from such exercise.

On a positive note, ECES has already received approval from the INEC and EUD to implement an updated work plan till end 2020. The document had been requested by EUD and it introduces important modifications to some activity lines though the lockdown will likely impact on its implementation. However, a formal report coming from INEC is still expected and therefore right now activities continue to be implemented without a definitive and more substantial fine tuning. A precious time has been lost and thus it is extremely urgent to complete such on-going evaluation. Emerging priorities coming from expected reports would be considered in a revised work plan till 2022.

Meanwhile, since the 2019 general elections some actions have been conducted by the project concerning the EMSC. The project has also provided some trainings in view of two off-cycle governorship elections for Bayelsa and Kogi states which were conducted in November 2019. Such actions, that likely anticipate future activities, prove that the EUSDGN programme and ECES in particular manage to properly address issues that arose from the elections.
Local ownership is still not completed and therefore activities for the second half play a crucial role in this regard

In terms of INEC’s capacities, activities already implemented fit with the Commission’s resources and improvements have been made in different areas with the cooperation of in-house assets. However, local ownership is still not completed and therefore activities for the second half should be shaped in such a way that consolidation of INEC’s internal expertise become more robust. If this approach is taken, the EUSDGN would have the capacity to complete a real knowledge transfer to the main beneficiary and thus help reducing INEC’s current partial dependency on external help.14

Some indicators reflect that there is room for improvement on that side, although ECES has a limited margin of manoeuvre due to the fact that activities have to be agreed with INEC and EUD. Next paragraphs provide examples where ownership could be enhanced and assess actions undertaken so far.

Some activities that were already active during previous development programmes show limited improvements on INEC’s institutional autonomy

If a comparison is made with the former UNDP’s programme on democratic governance, which was in place till 2018, coincidences will be easily spotted. For instance, the technical team next to the INEC’s Chair existed already at UNDP times and performed similar advisory tasks.15 Other examples include how the communications policy is drafted or in general terms all activities leading to INEC’s engagement with different groups. In a similar way, consideration was already given to an Electoral Management System (EMS) and external consultancy, which was managed by the same expert and supported by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), was provided to INEC.

Among these coincidences, it is to note that the support to the technical team attached to the Chairman’s office and the Election Monitoring Support Centre (EMSC) continue to be strategic tools intending to improve and strengthen the INEC’s overall performance. They possess the potential to have a direct impact on the whole structure and thus their proper implementation is a priority and should be duly assessed.

Having in mind the fact that both tasks already existed beforehand, it is worth wondering the extent to which such external help pursues and achieves a real consolidation of INEC’s capacities. While substantial improvements have been made through such two measures, they should be always deemed as provisional supports that pave the way to stronger INEC’s structures. Unfortunately, such final goal has not been achieved under the previous project, at least to the extent that would be reasonable. How to expect that the current project, with the same approach as the previous one, achieve a real qualitative upgrade where INEC would feel

14 In this regard, one of the seven priority recommendations highlighted by the 2019 EU EOM reads as follows: “Organisational and operational capacity within INEC be considerably strengthened. Improve planning, tracking, and the required human and material resources needed for timely and accountable operations. In addition, improve internal communication within INEC” (: 7).

15 Words used by the EU evaluation of the UNDP project can be repeated when assessing the current EUSDGN program: “DGD II provided a cohort of four consultants to the Chair of INEC; these four individual consultants were key personal advisors to the Chair and were reportedly brought on board at his request. These four professionals were experts – but not experts in particular areas of electoral administration. DGD II and EU Additional Support did not provide the conventional international electoral expertise to INEC that is typically provided through UNDP electoral support projects to provide technical assistance for targeted areas in electoral administration” (: 46).
much more self-confident and autonomous in the areas where international support has been needed so far?

Firstly, a technical team assigned to the office of the INEC Chairman is reasonable as an additional advisory asset. It can also be fruitful as a disruptive measure that aims at bringing in high level advisors that will shed light to main INEC problems. Apparently, that was the main reason when such a technical team was created years ago. However, its tasks should slowly evolve to an ordinary Chairman’s advisory taskforce. Deeper activities should be assigned to the relevant prospective and planning unit (i.e. research, expert advice, strategic program) and all directorates should be fully empowered as leaders of relevant executive branches.

Otherwise, a small unit could block the overall institutional consolidation acting as a filter through which any innovation should be channelled and thereby reducing the normal role of other INEC’s components, such as the National Commissioners or the Directorates. If such technical team becomes the primary INEC contact for external actors, as it has been the case according to some interlocutors, the role of executive branches is undermined and what was a brilliant initial idea, which aimed at improving INEC’s excellence, may become non-functional in the long run.

If the technical team is not supposed to be formally employed by INEC, as it happens right now, traditional bureaucratic restrictions can be circumvented and thus activities could be enhanced in an easier way, but, from an institutional perspective, such gains should not hide that it is just a temporary solution that at some point must disappear. Therefore, a balance is to be sought between the presence of a high-level advisory team, which is likely still necessary, with a real INEC’s consolidation as an institution whose civil servant corps is fully empowered and able to address any challenge, from ordinary management to high-level expertise, which could always benefit from punctual external support.

The second ECES narrative report highlights the “strategic role” of the technical team in some key activities “such as the EMSC and other training programmes”. The three advisors would also be “instrumental in planning and coordinating technical assistance” (: 7). Institutional goals, such as the efficiency of the Chairman’s office in coordinating actions or media outreach, are facilitated too. Finally, the advisors “mostly serve as lead resource persons and facilitators at workshops and seminars”.

Such a positive assessment is compatible with what has been said so far. In this regard, everybody agrees that the technical team is composed by very knowledgeable people and thus INEC’s performance is enhanced. That’s what the narrative reports duly reflect and such added value is not to be lost, but reports do not find out to what extent the technical team, with its current format, is to be perceived as a permanent institutional solution or as a temporary adjustment16. Such key question mark is crucial. Therefore, the second half of the program should pay attention to a final delivery where INEC’s human resources are more autonomous, self-confident and empowered. INEC’s coordinating units would also be fully embedded within the Commission’s organigram.

On a similar note, INEC management tools supported by ECES, particularly the EMSC, have been improved thanks to external consultancies carried out from previous times.

16 It is to note that the EU evaluation of the UNDP programme already warned about the limited INEC’s buy-in of such activities (: 68).
Such a successful outcome addresses a real INEC need, but conclusions in terms of INEC’s capacities are slightly different. Consultancies have been carried out by the same expert, who has been hired both by ECES and IFES. Moreover, the relevant INEC’s unit is poorly staffed during non-election periods. Again, a retrospective approach that encompasses both the current project and the IFES one shows that significant improvements have been made, but INEC’s real ownership remains low as long as internal capacities for certain aspects are not able to meet what is needed, in this case, EMSC management and evolution.

Details have been provided for two specific actions (i.e. establishment of a technical team and improvement of EMSC tool), but they were just pieces for a whole assessment where INEC’s ownership is the final goal. Relevance would not be met wherever actions comply with current needs, but capacities are just assessed on a short-term basis for on-going activities. Ownership also means activities leading to an institutionalisation and thus measures should lead to the consolidation of permanent structures.

Some pending activities of the working plan are key enablers for a stronger INEC’s ownership

INEC’s ownership is foreseen by the EUSDGN, but some key tasks have not been addressed so far, namely the one related to the assessment of INEC’s organigram and the human resources management: Staff capacity audit and needs assessment of INEC Departments and Units to determine competency level, training requirements, and development of targeted trainings (1.1.3)\(^\text{17}\). It aims at empowering INEC civil servants to avoid malpractices, enhance self-confidence and improve efficiency. Having strong and knowledgeable directorates facilitates INEC’s tasks. They serve as key enablers for a sustainable improvement of INEC’s performance.

Baseline studies are not developed though having been incorporated to the relevant working plan. Visible activities exist, even very successful ones, but a SWOT analysis would give deeper guidelines serving to better orientate work plan activities.

Finally, this activity has been replaced by an updated working plan approved after 2019 elections. For the time being, such plan ends in December 2020. Neither the initial postponement nor the current substitution are good signals. There are of course other activities that have been either postponed or replaced too, but action 1.1.3 was strategic since its impact covered all INEC and all topics. It was a structural improvement.

In this regard, the working plan till end 2020 foresees new activities that pursue different goals. They provide support to the INEC Strategic Plan (SP), to the Strategic Programme of Action (SPA) [1.1.3] and to the Election Project Plan (EPP) [1.1.4]. Both action lines come together with new 1.1.7 and 1.1.8 that consist in supporting INEC’s post-election review where, beyond tasks undertaken by the Technical Team itself (1.1.1), ECES input are always provided. According to the workplan description, ECES will support dissemination (i.e. publication of 1,000 copies and 1,000 CDs). Finally, a new 1.1.9 foresees legal advocacy.

\(^{17}\) As recalled by the formulation report, “after the 2011 elections, INEC undertook a detailed staff audit to establish staff responsibilities, qualifications and skills and functions with the aim of restructuring the Commission. Although significant achievements have been recorded in terms of transformation and increased sophistication in the delivery of the elections, there is still the continued need for reformation and strengthening of INEC institutional and administrative structures” (: 19 / Identification and Formulation of the Support to Nigeria’s Electoral Cycle 2015 – 2019)
Certainly, the plan has been drafted by ECES together with INEC. Moreover, such update has been requested by EUD considering 2019 EU EOM final report though not having INEC conclusions from 2019 elections yet. In any case, immediate structural actions have been replaced by others that rather look at what has to be done on a mid- or long-term basis (i.e. strategic and operational plans), but such general plans would have to be accompanied by baseline assessments highlighting specific gaps per topic. The situation could still be reversed for working plans to be implemented in 2021 onwards.

INEC is the main target for the EUSDGN component 1 and evaluators have seen real interest in the programme. Attendance to events, logistic institutional support and critical inputs serve as evidence of INEC’s commitment. However, it is to note that INEC’s needs and relevant development programmes are to be identified and established taking account of INEC’s own requests together with other complementary analytical sources. Otherwise, the support would lose significant inputs and would not be aligned with relevance as an evaluation criterion.

As earlier mentioned, monthly meetings gathering both INEC’s representatives with the EUD and all implementing partners guarantee a follow-up. They allow all players to find the best ways for coordinating implementation. However, INEC representation is exclusively ensured by the technical team which, in its current format, is deemed as a provisional addition to INEC. Having as well a representation from the permanent staff of INEC (e.g. a Director) would also demonstrate a higher commitment of INEC in the activities of the project.

Conclusions / relevance

C1 / The project is based on a solid analysis of the electoral situation in Nigeria, particularly the report and recommendations of the EU Electoral Observation Mission of 2015, and has benefitted from the experience of the EU which had been engaged in electoral support in Nigeria for years under different settings. The design and focus of the actions are firmly aligned with INEC priorities too.

C2 / Conditions exist for a completion of the project during the remaining implementation period though a definitive identification of evolving needs is necessary. While at mid-term of the project, the 2019 general elections provided the opportunity to revise the work plan and adapt the interventions to take stock of the lessons learnt. An update was agreed and carried out shortly after the elections, but a deeper revision using as a baseline all reports from the 2019 elections, particularly that of INEC, when available, would be useful.

C3 / Nigerian stakeholders are committed to a successful implementation of the project by undertaking joint activities and mobilising targeted audiences. However, local ownership is still not completed and therefore activities for the second half will play a crucial role in this regard. Special consideration should be given to all baseline studies foreseen by the work plan and the SWOT analysis of INEC staff.

C4 / The non-performance of activities provided in the project document in the area of voter registration may indicate that the assessment of their feasibility, or of the desire of the beneficiary to welcome international engagement in this sensitive domain was not fully considered at the time of the drafting of the project document.

C5 / Some activities that were already active during the previous development programmes show limited improvements on INEC institutional autonomy. This evaluation has allowed to identify some issues which are beyond the control of ECES, at the implementing stage of the
project, and come from the design of the project itself. In particular, this is the case of the provision of internationally funded expertise in positions which are regarded as essential for the operation of the Commission. While this high-level expertise is welcome, such provision without mechanisms to consolidate it into the fabric of the Commission is problematic. A primary instance is the technical team of advisers to the Chair of INEC. This action is the continuation of an international support which was provided under a previous project.

C6 / The Electoral Management Support Centre (EMSC) constitutes another example where continuity exists from previous international supports but, despite significant improvements have been made in their format and operation system, INEC autonomy remains low for running alone such tool.
2 – Coherence

**EQ2: To what extent compatibility (i.e. complementarity, consistency and coordination) exists with other activities in a given country, sector or institution?**

Many actors are usually involved in development programmes and that plurality may often create dysfunctions that undermines performance and their overall credibility. That’s why coherence intends to assess the compatibility among the different international assistance programmes that may exist in a given country at the same time. Coordination with local players is considered together to other aspects like overlapping / complementarity and in general the consistency of the overall international support.

In our case, the importance of such criterion is even higher if we take into account that the European Union, with ECES, is acting alone for the very first time in Nigeria, that is, the European Union decided not to join the UNDP basket fund that used to serve as a common platform of election-related matters in Nigeria\(^\text{18}\).

**EUSDGN Programme builds upon lessons learned from 2015 General Elections**

As already said, reports and interviews prove that the EUSDGN / Component 1 was drafted paying attention to what had been recommended by the **EU EOM 2015**. In this regard, a report released in November 2017\(^\text{19}\) includes a table that links each recommendation to specific activities included in the working plan. Moreover, according to information retrieved during the interviews, the project was conceived in 2016 jointly by INEC’s advisors and EU Delegation, whose proposals had the 2015 EU EOM Final Report as starting point.

**ECES work has not only taken into consideration past programmes, but also undertaken innovative measures**

Consistency has also been enhanced through a programme that intends to **continue what had been done till 2017**. Key actions as the drafting of policies by topic, the EMSC tool and last but least the presence of three advisors for the Chairman’s office do not represent a real novelty since similar activities were considered by previous development programmes, but ECES has further strengthened and improved most of them\(^\text{20}\), which is a good indicator for a coherent development programme.

Moreover, ECES’ role has not been limited to a simple continuation, which could have reflected a poor performance. Instead, **innovative tasks**, such as the LEAD training program\(^\text{21}\), re-

\(^{18}\) An EU evaluation exists on the performance of the previous UNDP basket fund and its recommendations to the European Union intend to “strengthen … tools and techniques for oversight and management of UNDP projects within the rules and regulations guiding the EU’s awards to UN organisations. As often the largest contributor to projects, the EU should strive to work more closely with UNDP or other implementing partners to improve project implementation and results” (: 71 / **Final Evaluation of the “Support to the Nigerian Electoral Cycle 2012-2015”**). On the other hand, in April 2016, a EU needs identification and formulation report established an updated framework for the intervention of the European Union in Nigeria in terms of governance and support to democratic instruments (see **Identification and Formulation of the Support to Nigeria’s Electoral Cycle 2015 – 2019**).

\(^{19}\) **Inception Report and Analysis of the Political and Electoral Context in Nigeria** (: 34-60)

\(^{20}\) Regarding the EMSC, for instance, see footnote below. Policies per topic have been updated (e.g. communications) and expanded (e.g. new policy on people with disabilities)

\(^{21}\) LEAD programs have been crafted by ECES and have been already implemented worldwide. In this regard, ECES facilitated their first implementation in Nigeria.
organisation of the INEC law library, setting up and equipping of a Media Monitoring Unit, as outreach activities or gathering all legal stakeholders for the first time, have also been brought in Nigeria.

Having in mind that the full EUSDGN programme encompasses five components, compatibility among activities undertaken by each implementer is a good parameter for assessing coherence. In this regard, ECES maintains regular conversations with other players and joint activities have been organised thereby addressing common challenges. It is the case at least with gender issues, political parties, media related activities, election violence and outreach activities in general.

Moreover, monthly meetings gather all implementers together with the EUD and INEC representatives. Potential overlaps and unexpected areas for cooperation can therefore be spotted and adjustments adopted accordingly. It is to note that, beyond component 1 that is led by ECES, three out of the four other components are run by CSOs and a Nigerian public institution. Such format enables a good interlocution between international actors, such as ECES for this case, and local organisations. Common languages and approaches tailored to Nigerian needs can be achieved in an easier way.

Cooperation with other international stakeholders exists thereby enhancing the overall coherence of development programmes in Nigeria

Despite the EUSDGN constituting the largest electoral cooperation programme in Nigeria nowadays, other international stakeholders are also active, and consistency should be assessed vis-à-vis these other initiatives as well. Evaluators identified actions being promoted at least by UNDP, Germany, UK(DFID) and USAID.

Germany supported ECES for the implementation of a project on: Preventing Election Violence and Education for Inclusion (PEV-EDI). The working plan foresaw “intensive voter education on violence prevention and mitigation and inclusive participation in the electoral process”. Total funds received was 337,830€.

The UK, through DFID, supports a 47 M£ project running from 2014 to 2022, whose objective is to “strengthen the democratic character of Nigerian political processes and outcomes by providing support to key electoral bodies, other relevant arms of government (such as the Legislature) and civil society organisations”. Some of the Nigerian implementers are the same as for EUSDGN.

USAID and DFID jointly fund a two-year (2019-2021) project of 7M USD implemented by IFES. It follows a similar intervention from 2014 to 2019. The project aims at “providing national-level

22 Libraries are often neglected by international development programs and it is not rare to find electoral management bodies with no resources in terms of electoral documentation and research. ECES addressed this gap with a first activity that intended to systematize existing resources. ECES also provide supplementary funds.

23 The INEC for the first time with support from ECES set up a media monitoring unit. Previously, the Commission staff were engaged in reviewing print media. A functional media monitoring unit which benefits from regular training support may afford the Commission the opportunity of utilising media monitoring techniques to carry out a full monitoring of all traditional and mainstream media. This will further support the improvement of INEC’s internal communication.

24 Stakeholders agreed that youth campuses were a disruptive activity in Nigeria with very successful results.

25 https://pev-edi.site

26 Deepening Democracy in Nigeria 2 (DDIN2); https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203851
capacity building to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), incorporating lessons learned from the 2019 election process in electoral management, inclusion of traditionally marginalised groups, voter education, electoral conflict monitoring and alternative dispute resolution processes, among many others.

UNDP, jointly with Norway, launched in 2018 a call for proposals offering small grants to CSOs for the implementation of Project Activities on Women’s Participation in Politics in Nigeria; as an example, it funded a short project “Supporting and Strengthening Women Capacity for Inclusive Participation in Politics and Governance in Anambra and Imo States” which ran from January to March 2019. On another note, UNDP also provided support to National Human Rights Commission on the Women Participation in Election Support Bill. Finally, when it comes to a direct involvement in INEC activities, UNDP was still active in June 2018 with an EMSC training.

ECES and IFES have collaborated to implement outreach activities of component 1 of EUSDGN. Coordination between ECES and IFES is important since the activities covered by IFES within the USAID/DFID funded project coincide with some of those covered by component 1. This is true from the mere point of view of avoiding overlapping and possible gaps, but also from the standpoint of substance, as there is only one INEC. From discussions with interviewees it is understood that coordination between the two organisations has been substantial and has even deepened with time.

In general terms, there are no clear overlaps or contradictory initiatives. The overall international support to Nigeria proves to be conducive to a strengthened and more credible political framework. Moreover, according to interlocutors and similarly to what happens within the EUSDGN programme, regular meetings are held gathering main international actors and thus information exchange, coordination and cooperation can be promoted.

Lessons learned from 2019 general elections give a new opportunity for enhancing coherence

The second half of implementation that lasts till June 2022 is meant to pay attention to some particular issues and thus achieve an even better coordination. First and foremost, such last two years should be mainly based on the 2019 EU EOM findings and recommendations. Important flaws regarding INEC’s performance are highlighted and some gaps are closely related to areas where ECES have already intervened and where an improvement was expected.

Among others, the EU EOM’s report is very critical to INEC’s communication policy and puts into question the transparency of the body in certain very sensitive moments, such as how the postponement of the elections was dealt with. This decision followed previous statements according to which no delays or logistic problems were expected, but the problem goes much beyond as the report recalls that “INEC gave regular updates on election preparations during

27 https://www.ifes.org/nigeria
https://twitter.com/Onyinyendubuisi/status/1095812537608798215
29 https://twitter.com/Onyinyendubuisi/status/1090634467344109568
30 https://twitter.com/segunolusola7/status/1010483465991712768
https://twitter.com/inecnigeria/status/1010482640598200473
https://twitter.com/Onyinyendubuisi/status/1010479835901095938
the week before the 23 February rescheduled election day, but before and after this, there was a lack of public communication” (: 15).

In this regard, it is worth noting that component 1 of the EUSDGN intended to improve communication skills and engagement with stakeholders and that important activities have already been undertaken, including an updated communications policy. Moreover, similar conclusions can be drawn from other 2019 EU EOM findings. Let us highlight, for instance, the problems that the mission observed during the voting, counting and collation stages. The EU EOM assessed training of polling staff negatively and calls for a significant improvement. Despite such topic is closely related to outcomes 1.1 and 1.2 of component 1 of EUSDGN program, INEC’s capacity is rather strengthened through other means. Polling staff, who are key actors for the election day, have not been considered so far. As long as this staff is only recruited shortly ahead of each election, activities could enhance current training strategies, establish continuous training procedures and take advantage of off-cycle elections for testing improvements.

According to interlocutors, a number of factors would prevent ECES full engagement in this particular area. Firstly, polling staff represents a huge amount of people and any international support will fall short to address such challenge, what is a reasonable forecast. Secondly, IFES has already been active in supporting Training of Trainers (ToT) for polling staff and thus ECES would be deemed to support other areas. However, there is still room for improvements and, having in mind how 2019 EU EOM highlights the importance of staff capacities, coherence would be enhanced if the EUSDGN component 1 is involved in activities related to training polling staff. Cooperation with IFES would also be strengthened and programme’s coherence enhanced.

In this regard, it is to note that the working plan till end 2020 includes a new activity that is focused on ad-hoc staff (1.2.6. Support to INEC Innovative Training methodologies for Ad-hoc staff and a comprehensive database for ad-hoc personnel). It is related to the outcome “Creation of a pool of better trained ad hoc staff for elections” and aspires to create a database and a training app. It is an extremely positive step in terms of coherence.

In line with this post-2019 reassessment, it is to note that the European Union has also deployed two other electoral missions to Nigeria during the EUSDGN implementation: an Electoral Follow Up Mission (EFM) in 2017 and an Electoral Expert Mission (EEM) for primary elections in 2018. Consistency of the programme’s component 1 would be enhanced with EFM and EEM recommendations and further actions adopted accordingly.

Regarding the EEM report, it remains not accessible for implementing partners and thus there is no room for adjustments. Consideration could be given to a partial disclosure that would allow for a better alignment of programme’s activities to EEM findings, but such decision is beyond ECES’ tasks.

On the other hand, the EFM report has been shared with implementing partners. Moreover, it was released when the EUSDGN programme was at its very first stage. Right now, the 2019 EU EOM Final Report is already available, but EU EFM 2017 should not be put aside since such EFM reports, which take place during non-election periods, reflect needs and challenges that EU EOM documents may not consider as being more focused on one particular event.
Outreach activities and INEC’s in-house expertise are complementary activities that need appropriate distinction of means used for each case.

Cooperation among EU SDGN implementers could be improved and a higher overall coherence achieved paying attention to the fact that different components call for the engagement of civil society. Topics such as women political involvement, vulnerable groups (e.g. Persons with Albinism, people with disabilities) or media environment need a close cooperation between public administration and CSOs. Similarly, other topics, such as electoral offences or election dispute resolution, also require joint approaches from political parties, civil society (e.g. human rights watch groups) and again the public administration. INEC is supposed to play a key role in almost any election-related field.

The EUSDGN addresses such challenges with a first distinction between INEC’s institutional capacities, which is mainly dealt by ECES through component 1, and other activities led by components’ implementers that intend to enhance awareness on various topics. As long as both CSOs and INEC need to interact when addressing such areas, different components include similar activities when it comes to the promotion of women, people with disabilities and other topics. Certainly, component 1 tries to address them from an INEC’s perspective and thus internal staff training or INEC’s policy documents are foreseen, but there is still room for improvements, making clearer how each component should address common topics and reinforce thereby each other.

Moreover, if activities are organised jointly by different implementers, as it often happens, relevant approaches from each one may be easily blurred. Cooperation is very much welcome, but joint activities should not just consist in putting together certain resources (e.g. venues, transportation, facilitators, etc.). Instead, resources provided by each component should reflect what its role within the EUSDGN is.

In ECES’ case, for instance, contributions to joint activities should consist in making more visible INEC’s own approach and strengthening its capability to address common targets. INEC’s role is different to the one assumed by CSOs and that distinction should be kept when it comes to the programme’s implementation. In other words, the internal coherence of the actions under component 1 should also be assessed from the point of view of its key objective, which consists in strengthening INEC’s capacities. The reliance of INEC on ECES to organise with stakeholders’ activities which are part of its mandate might go against this primary objective. A basic distinction between training seminars for INEC staff and INEC outreach activities is to be maintained though both goals could be present at the same time in one single activity.

Having in mind the first half on the implementation program, activities have been organised together with other partners, namely when it comes to outreach programmes or sensitisation actions, and INEC representatives often attended them in various capacities. This is a good indicator. ECES would serve as a logistic facilitator and/or provide technical expertise of innovative trainings, such as BRIDGE or LEAD ones. INEC staff with accreditation as trainers could be further engaged together with ECES provided experts.

In this regard, main indicators within the workplan refer to output 1.2 (INEC’s capacity for efficient internal communication and engagement mechanisms with stakeholders enhanced). Such output encompasses from a very general 1.2.2 (Support INEC engagement with stakeholders) to more specific targets, such as 1.2.3 (Support to innovative voter and education outreach, in particular for women, youth and marginalised groups) or 1.2.8 (Support the
engagement of marginalised groups in the electoral process), and methodological inputs, such as 1.2.4 (Civic and Voter education harmonisation platform) or 1.2.6 (Training of trainers for youth in the National Youth Service). Activities also included 1.2.5 (Training of the staff in charge of the INEC Contact Centre) and 1.2.7 (BRIDGE training of SIEC Gender desk officers). Examples for all these activities are provided in the section devoted to effectiveness.

While some activities are limited to INEC staff, such as 1.2.5 and 1.2.7, others envisaged larger targets, such as 1.2.6 and 1.2.3, and finally 1.2.2 served as a general umbrella for almost any activity related to INEC outreach. Significantly enough, 1.2.5 and 1.2.7 had not yet been implemented by June 2019 and the same goes for 1.2.4, whose budget line has been used to strengthen other related activities.

In general terms, the first half of programme implementation in output 1.2 has emphasised those activities that reverted directly to stakeholders. Therefore, consideration during the second half should be further given to an internal enhancement of INEC capabilities. Such reorientation would be aligned with what has been already said above about how to address output 1.1. Moreover, 2017 EU EFM final report already recalled that, according to international donor and implementing partners, a “need for long-term support to INEC for human resources capacity building” exists and, as already said, the 2019 EU EOM (3:7) final report insists on that point with a priority recommendation.

In this regard, the working plan till end 2020 shows paradoxes. While it renounces to the SWOT analysis, as already recalled, it also creates promising new activity lines, such as a database for ad-hoc staff and a training application (1.2.6). Beyond modifications and updates, focus on internal structural actions should be strengthened.

Finally, it is to note EUSDGN’s self-restraint when it comes to activities related to voter registration in component 1. In this regard sensitiveness and sovereignty cannot be seen as unexpected barriers since conditions remain the same from the conceptualisation phase, when activities were introduced in a work plan that had been agreed with INEC. Therefore, consideration could be given to an enhanced triangulation with other development partners and INEC so as to take full advantage from all funds that relate to certain sensitive topics.

Conclusions / coherence

C7/ The programme continues the support undertaken by previous international development programs and builds upon lessons learned from 2015 General Elections. While consistency is kept by maintaining certain activities, ECES’ work combines consideration to past programmes with certain innovative measures in terms of training methodology, outreach activities or INEC’s inclusiveness with local players.

C8/ The project is coherently articulated with other interventions in the same domain. This is the case within the EUSDGN. There is a working coordination mechanism among the five components, under the leadership of the EU Delegation, and there is a number of examples of collaboration between ECES and the implementers of the other components.

C9/ Cooperation with other international stakeholders exists thereby enhancing the overall coherence of international development programmes in Nigeria. No significant overlaps have been identified either.
C10/ INEC outreach activities and INEC in-house expertise are complementary goals that need different means to be achieved. While INEC is supposed to enhance awareness on electoral issues and partnerships with civil society organisations play a crucial role in this regard, INEC also pays attention to internal empowerment. EUSDGN component 1 combines both angles, but in general terms the first half of programme implementation, and namely output 1.2, has emphasized those activities that reverted directly to stakeholders.
3 – Effectiveness

The effectiveness criterion is intended to measure the extent to which the intervention achieved, or is expected to achieve, its intermediary results; it takes account of the relative importance of the progress and process where successive activities are articulated for reaching the expected objectives or results.

EQ3: To what extent has the intervention achieved its intermediary results and contributed to improving INEC management of the 2019 elections? To what extent has it contributed to fostering INEC’s capacities towards its stakeholders, voters, political parties?

The component 1 of EUSDGN encompasses a wide variety of activities, defined in six different outputs of a fairly different nature, particularly regarding implementation strategies, ownership by the beneficiary and capacity for the project to bring change. Unsurprisingly the assessment is largely different depending on the objectives and expected results. Beyond the achievement “on the paper”, the record of the 2019 general elections, although the INEC report is not yet available, and the report of the 2019 EUEOM provide useful information on the effectiveness of the activities conducted under the project and help assessing the results achieved.

The project aims at supporting one of the largest EMB in the world, with over 16,000 permanent staff supplemented by ad-hoc staff at election time, rendering particularly challenging to involve a significant proportion of its staff in trainings. These figures also indicate that INEC is a powerful entity fully capable to process EUSGDN support. Capacities are not therefore a barrier for the overall performance of ECES’ activities.

All interviewees have acknowledged that in many of the areas covered by the project, ECES has conducted during the period June 2017 - February 2020 an impressive array of activities. This is also reflected in the ECES Annual Narrative Reports and the monitoring system which collect all ECES data. Beside the procurement of equipment which has been performed according to plans, a large number of activities was implemented despite a relatively slow start of the project and an absence of visible and reported activities for four months following the general elections. There are, however, areas where none of the activities provided in the project document was conducted during the period of reference.

ECES Narrative Reports (year 1 and 2) and interviews confirm that ECES has always positively responded to requests and therefore delivered according to the project documents and workplan. Reactivity and flexibility of ECES have been spontaneously highlighted by a majority of interviewees.

The holding of elections eighteen months after the beginning of the project provides useful information to assess its actual effectiveness. Referring particularly to the report of the 2019

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31 According to the 2019 EU EOM report, over the election-day period INEC appointed some 900,000 ad hoc staff including polling officers, polling supervisors, collation officers and returning officers.

32 Establishment of the Results Based and Monitoring and Evaluation framework – Report 1 January – March 2018
EU EOM\textsuperscript{33}, it is clear that for some of the outputs, progress has remained limited and achievements “on the paper” are not confirmed by this live experience\textsuperscript{34}.

Soon after the general election of February-March 2019, an updated work plan was set up, under the impulse of the EUD, although the INEC report on the elections was not (and is not) yet available. It was prepared by ECES and shared with and commented by INEC and appears as an effort to draw the first lessons from the elections and revise accordingly the project’s work plan. But it does not lead, at this stage, to an overall review of the strategy and eventual new orientations of the intervention.

This is confirmed by the project’s activities conducted since the elections after a short period with no reported and visible activities until June 8\textsuperscript{th} while the Commission was busy with collation of results and re-run for inconclusive elections. The list\textsuperscript{35} of implemented activities from June 2019 to date shows a focus on two areas. Firstly, post-elections reviews directed at different categories of audiences, including a comprehensive one on the EMSC; secondly, activities in States where governorship elections were taking place (Bayelsa and Kogi), which have included outreach and voter education workshops, training on EMSC and security. Additionally, ECES has conducted a media monitoring training, supported another regional meeting of ECONEC, and lately facilitated discussions on the reform of the electoral law which is another innovative activity that brought together members of the National Assembly and INEC for the first time to comprehensively review the electoral legal framework. This record of activities is certainly welcome, particularly when it concerns the EMSC and post-elections reviews.

However, when the INEC report on the 2019 elections will be available, some further analysis on the effectiveness of the activities implemented so far should be expected. Some objectives could be re-discussed with INEC and eventually revisited for the second part of the project implementation. Next to the lessons learnt from the 2019 elections, the following remarks should be considered.

The EUSDG narrative reports provide information about activities and results achieved for each case. However, it is necessary to have an evaluation on how these new inputs are actually implemented by INEC units. Such exercise is crucial for transforming theoretical models to real changes.

The nature of ECES contribution to the effective achievement of the results needs to be closely examined. Although it is understood that ECES is associated to the conceptualisation of the activities, such as drafting the agenda, setting the expected outcomes and that ECES’ material support is essential to put the activity in place, there are some areas where the most visible contribution of ECES consists of taking care of the material aspects of activities (e.g. venue, catering and/or printing documents). This is particularly the case where the activity is cross-cutting with other actions falling under other components of EUSDG. It remains difficult to assess the exact amount of expertise provided by ECES in those instances, since this is done within planning sessions and interactions with INEC or within the Project Technical Committee.

\textsuperscript{33} EU Election Observation Mission, Nigeria, 2019 General Elections, Final Report

\textsuperscript{34} Monitoring and Evaluation Report – Year 2 - June 2018 – June 2019

\textsuperscript{35} There is obviously no ECES Narrative Report for the third year of the project covering year 3 (June 2019 – June 2020)
Output 1- INEC strategic planning, policy framework and operational capacity and systems strengthened

Under output 1, action 1.1.1 consists in the secondment of high level technical and advisory electoral expertise to the INEC Chair. This was implemented from the very start of the project.

There are clear indications that the three advisers are competent professionals with a strong expertise in electoral matters, strong experience in the advisory role to the chairmanship of INEC, and have, from the perspective of the evaluators, the required capacity to both deliver high level advises and provide guidance in election management.

From the interviews, it appears that effectiveness of this action is perceived from two different angles: 1) contribution to the implementation of the project since the advisers are regarded by some of the interviewees as “agents” of the project, which actually provides for their financial compensation; 2) enhancement of INEC capacity since they are tasked to provide advises and expertise to the Chair of INEC.

Referring to the first angle, there are mixed views. On the one hand, the advisers are described as being facilitators in the relationship with the Commissioners (“they have the ears of the Commissioners” as this has been told to the evaluators) and helpful to circumvent the normal bureaucracy. The advisers themselves have highlighted their daily and smooth interaction with the ECES team. On the other hand, it stems from some conversations that, at times, a direct interaction with Directors of INEC Departments would be more effective.

Referring to the second angle – enhancement of INEC capacity -, the provision of highly qualified experts is per se an achievement; however, the activity reports drafted by the advisers – not provided quarterly as specified in the ToR for this action – in their current format, cover more the activities of INEC during the reporting period than the activities of the advisers themselves and do not really allow to measure how effective this action is. The conclusion reached in the Monitoring and Evaluation report of year 1 remains valid: “the INEC advisors’ ToR cover daily INEC tasks, thus it is difficult to attribute INEC work progress/results to the advisors’ interventions, as the specific INEC advisors’ contribution is not specified.”

Regarding ECES’ support to the Election Management System (1.1.2), starting in year 1 of the implementation of the project, numerous trainings (first activity held in September 2017) were delivered and workshops held to meet the objective of strengthening the EMS – and scaling it up in a Centre (EMSC) - while a consultant was hired to help the process. During year 2, an EMSC workplan was developed for the implementation of its activities with the 2019 general elections (GE) in focus, and the EMSC was deployed for off-cycle elections with the

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36 Two are university professors and have already worked with the INEC under previous electoral support; one, the Chief Press Secretary is a seasoned journalist. Interviews confirmed the appreciation for the professional competence of the advisers.

37 The reports were made available to the evaluators.

38 The ToR provide for, among the expected results of the action, the provision of “quarterly reports or as requested to the European Union copied to ECES” ; however, the Chief Technical Adviser provided so far two reports covering respectively the periods June 2017-May 2018 and June 2018-April 2019; the Special Adviser three reports covering respectively the periods June 2017-May 2018, June 2018-April 2019, June 2019-October 2019; the Chief Press Secretary three reports covering respectively June 2017-May 2018, June 2018-April 2019, May 2019-December 2019.

39 Final M&E Review Report, p. 40
support of ECES. Project Narrative Report for year 2 highlights the intensive training supported by ECES for INEC staff involved in the EMSC.

The current EMSC is the last version of an Election Management System (EMS) as a way for the modernisation of INEC’s internal procedures. ECES’ action, notably with the provision of a dedicated expert, is the continuation of the work previously undertaken by the IFES run project in a crucial domain to facilitate the integration of management tools which were segmented by directorates.

ECES has provided an important support to the EMSC. These activities have already brought significant changes which have been implemented both in off-cycle and 2019 General Elections.

ECES action has helped the evolution from a “System” to a “Centre”, which is a positive step towards a greater institutionalisation. Within EMSC, ECES has supported the strengthening of a Performance Management Dashboard and a Communication Tool designed to provide information and indicators on the exact logistical situation on the ground which is another significant change. Thanks to these efforts, the EMS appears more enshrined in the electoral landscape and better equipped.

However, these changes supported by the project do not seem to have yielded all the desired results at the time of the 2019 elections.

The EU EOM report notes that “statements affirming that preparations were on track contrasted with the reality that became apparent with the announced postponement. […] The INEC chairperson gave reasons of being overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the operation of the general elections and bad weather”. Interviews conducted for this evaluation have not given further clarity on the exact reasons for the difficulties encountered on the occasion of 2019 General Elections, and the extent to which the capacity to make a full use of the EMSC is part of the issue. Some interviewees also indicated that the EMS was not the key decision-making instrument when the decision to postpone the elections just a few hours before the opening of the polls was pronounced.

There are nevertheless some interrogations as to the consolidation of this internationally supported expertise in the operation of INEC. The fact that despite the existence of the EMSC, INEC did not react early enough to answer to the gaps in the preparation of the elections and to avoid their last minute postponement does not mean that the establishment of the EMSC is not an important improvement compared to the management capacity of the INEC at the time of the 2015 general elections, but it also highlights some limitations.

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40 According to the ECES narrative report (year 2), the new “EMSC is a product of the merging of three operational tools namely; The Election Management System (EMS), Electoral Operations and Support Centre (EOSC) and Election Risk Management (ERM) to form the Election Management Support Centre (EMSC) to ensure a smooth implementation of the logistical and operational aspects of the elections” (1: 7). Moreover, a new version of the EMSC was launched and “the Dashboard is designed to capture all INEC activities, including the Threats/Risk indicators, Election Project Plan (EPP) calendar as well as Green, Amber and Red Zone activities. The database was also modelled to capture the entire geographical information of the country – State, Local Government Areas (LGAs), Registration Areas (RAs), Senatorial districts, Federal and state constituencies and Polling Units” (1: 9). Other innovations comprise an extended WhatsApp component (1: 10).

41 EU Election Observation Mission, Nigeria, 2019 General Elections, Final Report
While the EMSC is a sophisticated management tool, **it may call for further training**, including at local level, and a better integration within the early alert and decision-making process of INEC. Evaluators have noted that a training on EMSC planned for May-July 2018 was postponed to November-December 2018 because, reportedly INEC had higher priorities. Having the training so close to elections might have been less effective than at the initial date. From the perspective of this mid-term evaluation, this calls for taking advantage of an election free period for further training, including some form of testing of the trainees on the acquired skills after the various training sessions. The EMSC post-elections review held in September 2019 goes in the right direction in this respect, but more might be needed to render this central activity more effective. It is an area that the project should continue to consider as one of its priorities, provided considerations on sustainability are also duly addressed (see below under sustainability).

Under action 1.1.6, during year 2, the ECES ICT team supported the **mapping and reconfiguration of the polling stations** and was also requested to assist in the **enhancement of the Geographic Information System (GIS) laboratory**. During year 2, activities were also initiated to help improve the GIS and provide a service for voters to locate their polling stations. This included an assessment of existing IT components in the GIS laboratory, preparation of 2019 GIS laboratory re-activation, training sessions and workshops. ECES also coordinated the development and deployment of an online application service for voters to locate their polling units.

**Some of the specific objectives under output 1 have been left aside** so far, starting with the “Staff capacity audit and needs assessment of INEC Departments and Units to determine competency level, training requirements, and development of targeted trainings”, which included in the work plan a SWOT analysis (1.1.3). While the first narrative report recalls that a SWOT analysis is foreseen, INEC reportedly did not request its implementation and therefore the action would have likely taken place after the 2019 elections. However, the second narrative report, which encompasses till June 2019, that is, already after the elections, just repeats that the SWOT has not been requested so far. Further it does not appear in the updated workplan to be implemented till end 2020. **Not conducting needs assessments and baselines studies has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of trainings.**

Consideration should also be paid to the extent to which beneficiaries are consolidating their acquired knowledge into their day to day activities. In this regard, like most development programmes, ECES support has focused on equipment, training and policy documents. More attention needs to be paid on how these tools and the acquired knowledge are embedded in ordinary tasks with indicators set.

The activity under “Assessment and training on the electronic collation and transmission of results” (1.1.5) was not conducted as well; the reason is that INEC did not pursue with the plan of having an electronic collation and transmission of results.

1. **Output 2 – INEC capacity for efficient internal communication and engagement mechanisms with stakeholders enhanced**

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42 Annual Narrative Report (Year 2)
43 Annual Narrative Reports
44 “Although a SWOT analysis was planned and budgeted for in the PRODOC, INEC has so far not requested its implementation. The exercise therefore might take place after the elections of 2019” (: 26)
45 “Although a SWOT analysis was planned and budgeted for in the PRODOC, the activity is yet to be requested” (: 32).
A lot of activities were conducted under output 2. A review of the INEC communication policy was conducted during the first months of the project, embracing both internal and external communication. According to the ECES Annual Narrative Reports, the goals were to establish an INEC Communication Policy that would drive voter education and communication for the 2019 and future elections and to strengthen the responsiveness of INEC Communication Policy to emerging electoral issues.

The project has also supported the establishment of a Media Monitoring Unit in INEC, a totally new development in INEC. The action included procurement and training of some staff. Seventy-one media managers and editors benefitted from a briefing on the preparation of the 2019 elections; a capacity building session was held for a hundred and eight members of the INEC Press Corps; a two-day workshop, involving fifty-six Publicity Affairs Officers from all thirty-six states and the FCT, as well as INEC HQ staff, was devoted to the issues of identifying fake news and providing strategies to address/counter the phenomena. INEC’s website was also improved. Overall, with the support provided by ECES on IT, INEC appears better equipped for its communication policy.

One of the interviewees underlined that INEC has acquired a stronger capacity regarding the content of its communication. Thanks to the work done during the last two years, INEC has moved from a reactive type of communication towards a more pro-active attitude and has acquired a stronger capacity in strategic and crisis communication. This is also the case of its capacity to combat fake news.

However, the available record of what happened in this domain at the time of the elections shows some limitations. The 2019 EUEOM Report notes that “INEC gave regular updates on election preparations during the week before the 23 February rescheduled election day, but before and after this there was a lack of public communication” and that “INEC also lacks an effective internal communication system for a timely and reliable flow of information between national, state and local government INEC offices”.46

In this respect, it is suggested to focus on the INEC internal capacity to interact with social media and the design of a broader and more robust communication strategy.

ECES also provided support to INEC’s engagements with stakeholders on voter registration and the collection of the Permanent Voters’ Card (PVC) (1.2.3), at a time when, reportedly, INEC had not received the necessary funds for this activity, making there a visible difference in domains important to build voter’s confidence in the electoral process and to keep up with the electoral calendar. The focus was particularly put on women and persons with disabilities (PWDs).

Another milestone activity of the first year of the project was the University Campus Outreach, jointly supported with the EUD and other EUSDGN partners, continued during year 2 where the activity was held in the six geopolitical zones (1.2.3). All interviewees praised its effectiveness in a country where the youth constitutes a large segment of the population. ECES also supported INEC to convene the Interactive Session with INEC Youth Ambassadors. This was completed by the production of educational materials for the public at large (mini-movies, animations, jingles and an election song).

46 EU Election Observation Mission, Nigeria, 2019 General Elections, Final Report, p. 16
**Voter education and outreach to some specific target groups** are certainly activities for which the expectations in terms of effectiveness are usually reasonably high, particularly when addressed to the **youth**. Developed as in the case of this project at university level, youth outreach contributes to shape a new generation of educated citizens. The high appreciation that the evaluators received from most of the interviewees on this activity confirms that this is perceived as such.

**The gender issue was addressed in a comprehensive range of activities:** a specific BRIDGE training of INEC national and State Gender desk officers, conducted in year 1 of the project; support to the organisation of a National conference on “INEC’s Role in Enhancing Women Participation in the Electoral Process: Creating Synergy Amongst Women Politicians, Scholars and Activists”; a one-day National Dialogue with Nigerian Women and the support to the design, production and broadcast of three editions of a television documentary on women in politics.

**PWDs issue was as well addressed** with a roundtable with political parties and another BRIDGE training for 62 INEC PWD desk officers from across the country, and the support given to the development and publication of a Disability Inclusion Manual for the training of INEC staff nationwide.

**The elections have nevertheless shown the limitations to the effectiveness of such activities.** The 2019 EUEOM notes that **national turnout** for the presidential election was 28,614,190, a reduction of 817,893 from 2015, even though Nigeria’s population has increased, as has the number of registered voters. It is particularly important to consider that **many factors influence voter participation, some of which are beyond the reach of an election assistance program.** However, **some lessons could be learnt** to define what effective actions should be conducted in the remaining time of the project.

**The emphasis put by the project on women participation, with highly visible events, may not have yielded actual achievements,** underlining the depth of the challenges to be addressed in this domain, although disaggregated data from INEC only show the percentage of women candidates and elected.

The declining women representation, both in terms of voters and elected representatives, in the 2019 elections, confirming a trend which had started more than ten years ago in Nigeria, **highlights the need to evaluate the real effectiveness of such interventions.** ECES notes that women winning elections shouldn’t be perceived as the sole success indicator of implementing activities that had promoted the participation of women in the electoral process as it was observed by some interviewees that the turnout was higher where voter education was conducted and helped to raise the consciousness of people on the issue, typically an area where transformative effect can only be slow.

It should also be noted that **the campus outreach activities seem to have an impact which goes beyond the mere awareness raising goal.** According to one of the interviewees, they have provided INEC with more understanding on the reasons why the youth’s participation in elections remains low, have helped INEC to identify motivated young people who can then contribute to the operation of the polling units on election day, and because they involve some INEC staff, they contribute to their training.

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47 EU Election Observation Mission, Nigeria, 2019 General Elections, Final Report, p. 17

48 The EU EOM 2019 Nigeria General Elections notes that women were slightly underrepresented as voters and that fewer women were elected to Parliament compared to 2015; Report pp. 49 et al.
Addressing the civil society, the project helped the convening of INEC/CSO forums in two locations (Enugu and Kano) in fall 2018.

There are other activities planned under output 2 which were not undertaken at all: under **output 2:** training of the staff in charge of the INEC Contact Centre (1.2.5) and the work on a methodological tool and a baseline study.

2. **Output 3:** INECs periodic voter registration system for a largely clean register of voters supported

**No activity was undertaken by ECES under output 3.** ECES Narrative Reports indicate that “INEC did not provide ECES with the required access to CVR audit staff and data to perform an assessment” (year 1) and considered it was too close to the 2019 GE to conduct activities on periodic voter registration (year 2). No activity has been undertaken to date after the 2019 general elections under the updated workplan. Although not discussed with most of interviewees, it appears that this domain touches on politically sensitive matters, where foreign technical assistance might not be welcome. However, very recently (February 2020), ECES has been associated to some reflection undertaken by INEC in this domain. ECES participates in an INEC technical committee which has produced reports for the establishment of a Polling Unit Information and Voter Registration System for the Commission. But there is no indication at this stage when the activity will be implemented and what ECES further contribution will/would be.

3. **Output 4:** INEC oversight of political parties strengthened

**Regarding INEC oversight of political parties, ECES has conducted several significant activities,** often in collaboration with implementing partners of component 3 as there are common grounds between both this specific output and the overall objective of component 3. Effective collaboration between ECES and these other implementing partners, particularly NIPSS, has been underlined by all interviewees with whom these activities were discussed.

This has enabled a commendable range of activities, starting in year 1 of the project: a Workshop on the Review of the Reporting Templates for Campaign Finance and Political Party Congresses, Convention and Primaries; a workshop on the Review of Guidelines and Manuals for monitoring of political parties and election observation; a financial and logistical support to the validation and adoption event of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties for the 2019 elections; a five day working retreat for 23 INEC Election and Party Monitoring (EPM) staff to review and update the guidelines and manuals for political party monitoring and election observation thanks to which INEC has acquired a new set of guidelines and a new manual to be used in the 2019 elections; a seminar for members of newly registered political parties to comply with the reporting procedures of INEC.

Under this output, year 2 has witnessed a more limited range of activities. However, a Methodology Workshop on Campaign Finance Tracking and Debriefing of INEC Monitors following the party primaries was held in November 2018 as well as two one-day Training session for EPM staff on the Commission-approved redesigned campaign finance tracking forms.

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49 ECES Interim Narrative Report, June 2017 – June 2018
50 ECES Annual Narrative Report (Year 2), June 2018 – June 2019
However, on INEC’s capacity to exert an oversight of political parties, the effectiveness of the action remains limited. The core issue is of legal nature and goes beyond the reach of the project since INEC is confronted with the contradictions of the Electoral Law. On the capacity of INEC to monitor the parties’ primaries, the EU EFM 2017 notes that “INEC is assigned a competence it cannot fully exercise”\(^{51}\). However, the same report suggests that “INEC could benefit from an administrative mechanism” to allow it to “preclude nominations for candidacy” not fulfilling constitutional or legal provisions. Activities conducted by the project under output 1.4, and particularly 1.4.5, could be pursued and revisited with the lessons learned from the 2019 elections and referring to EU EFM findings. After the 2019 general elections, ECES has supported discussions on the reform of the Electoral Law. This is an important achievement as this is the first time members of the National Assembly have sat together with the Commission to brainstorm on a comprehensive review of the electoral legal framework.

Under specific objective 4.6. two regional conferences were organised with ECES’ support\(^{52}\). The first brought together 312 Economic Community of West African States/ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions (ECOWAS/ECONEC) and Electoral Commissions Forum of Southern African Development Community (ECF-SADC) representatives while the second was a symposium on inclusivity in the West African region alongside the ECONEC sixth General Assembly\(^ {53}\). Although the effectiveness of such international gathering is often questioned, it should be emphasized that peer exchange may be a strong tool for change, and even more importantly it puts thereafter each participating EMB and their staff under the virtuous scrutiny of each other.

**Output 5: INECs legal capacities and competences in election alternate dispute resolution are fostered**

Under this output, in year 1, only the support to the law library of INEC was achieved, with the cataloguing and categorisation of all legal documents and the training of about 40 INEC lawyers and staff as well as Electoral Institute staff. This achievement was particularly lauded by the Commissioners who were interviewed who praised an easier access to legal documentation.

In year 2, more activities were conducted: a two-day training for INEC legal staff and police officers was held in the six geopolitical zones on the effective prosecution of electoral disputes; a two-day training was held in four geopolitical zones to familiarise participants with existing international and regional best practices to handle complaints and appeals and provide information on newly introduced and potential amendments to the Constitution and Electoral Act; a Workshop on Pre-Election Matters was organised and attended by 329 officials, including the Presidents of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, Federal High Court, Judges of the Federal High Court and State High Courts, as well as most of the judges appointed to serve on the Electoral Tribunals; ECES also supported the training of 600 security personnel in six states focused on electoral security roles and responsibilities of security personnel, voters’ rights and electoral offences. However, the 2019 EU EOM notes that “incidents of violence, including

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\(^{51}\) EU Election Follow-up Mission to Nigeria 2017, Final Report

\(^{52}\) Opportunities and Challenges in the Use of Technology in Elections, Experiences from West and South Africa, Abuja, Nigeria, 9-11 April 2018

\(^{53}\) ECONEC symposium on promotion of inclusivity in the electoral process and the sixth ECOWAS network of electoral commissions biennial general assembly, 5 – 7 August 2019
against electoral staff, damaged the process [and that] parties and security agencies did not sufficiently protect citizens’ right to vote safely free from intimidation” Collaboration between INEC and police has remained limited and insufficient to prevent several serious incidents.\(^{54}\)

**Under output 5**, compilation of landmark judicial decisions in the electoral process (1.5.3) and foster better understanding and use of EADR by training INEC staff (1.5.6) were not undertaken.

**Output 6: FOSIECON (Forum of State Independent Electoral Commissions) institutional capacity and collaboration with stakeholders enhanced**

**Under this output only one activity was conducted in year 1**, with a LEAD workshop for 39 SIEC members. In year 2, more activities were conducted, including another LEAD training in which some FOSIECON staff participated, and a support to allow six members of the FOSIECON to observe the Osun Governorship election which took place on 22nd September 2018.

Overall, this indicates that **under output 6, several activities have not yet been undertaken**: workshop on the use of technology by FOSIECON (1.6.2); training on the harmonisation of regulations for FOSIECON (1.6.3), a more structured and broader peer exchange program (1.6.4) and pilot support to targeted SIEC (1.6.5).

**Conclusions / effectiveness**

C11/ Once it reached its cruising speed, by the fall of 2017, the project has conducted a remarkably high number of activities. In a context marked by the mounting pressure of the preparation of the 2019 elections, ECES has been praised for its capacity to respond swiftly to the requests of INEC, with flexibility and a goodwill which has been unanimously recognised. ECES is commanded for bringing high level experts and, in comparison to previous projects, an innovative approach.

C12/ Achievements comprise an EMSC with a broader scope, outreach activities, such as several successful youth campus awareness-raising events, liaison initiatives with legal practitioners and new mechanisms for political parties and media monitoring.

C13/ A special attention should be paid to the effectiveness of the provision of three experts who act as advisers to the Chairman of INEC. An assessment is needed to determine whether what “seems to be a good and inevitable idea on the paper”, according to one of our interviewees, is achieving the expected results. Positioned next to the Commission’s Chair, it can be expected that their contribution is particularly essential on the most sensitive issues.

C14/ The modalities of the support to the EMSC do not ensure the consolidation of the internationally supported expertise in the operation of INEC. This central element of the Commission rests upon the input of a technical expert under the impulse of one of the Adviser

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\(^{54}\) See the EU Election Observation Mission, Nigeria, 2019 General Elections, Final Report: “The Electoral Act gives INEC responsibility to lead on electoral security matters, with powers to request and determine deployment of security personnel in consultation with the security agencies. This was managed through the INEC-chaired Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES), involving all the responsible agencies, including the military. While in principle this provided for positive collaboration, in practice it was not sufficiently effective“ (: 35).
to the Chair. Efforts to associate in a structured manner several directors of departments in the remaining time of the project could help to mend the current situation.

C15/ While the INEC report on the 2019 elections is not yet available, a limited update of the workplan has been conducted shortly after the elections. However, **some further internal reflection on the effectiveness of the activities undertaken so far in the light of the elections would be welcome.** Objectives should be re-discussed with INEC and eventually revisited for the second part of the project implementation.

C16/ **Activities regarding voter education could be revisited,** with the view of narrowing the current scope and prioritizing some issues, particularly activities in favour of women participation. ECES could contribute to identify these issues, including with reference to the findings of the EUEOM, EFM and EEM (if available) on this point\(^55\).

C17/ ECES could envision to multiply the effectiveness of the **youth outreach activities** by organising the events not only in different types of educational institutions, such as Colleges and Polytechnics schools, but also in more States. To maximize the impact on INEC as well, the modality of organising technical committee meetings involving INEC staff from the headquarters and states as was obtainable during the implementation of these activities should be sustained to ensure maximum impact.

C18/ Attention should be paid to some of the **activities which were not conducted.** Interviews have confirmed that this is because INEC had no appetite for them. However, it should be noted that while some of them can be detached from the rest of the agreed work plan and their non-achievement may not impact the effectiveness of other actions (e.g. the support to voter registration), this is not the case of all of them. **Not conducting needs assessments and baselines studies has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of trainings.**

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4 – Efficiency

**EQ4: To what extent the intervention delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in a cost-efficient and timely way? To what extent value for money is applied?**

This criterion intends to assess how the resources are used and to what extent the same goals might be achieved with other better means. The question mark does not take into consideration the result itself, but the procedure that has been used. Budgetary, human and material resources need to be evaluated and consideration should be given to alternative ways of implementation.

The partnership between ECES and EU is funded upon solid bases that enhance efficiency. Co-funded projects as well as non-profit actors pave the path for such a positive outcome.

At a first glance, it is worth noting that ECES stands as a non-profit organisation that has contributed 5% to the overall budget of the EUSDGN’s component 1. Both elements indicate high efficiency. Choosing a non-profit entity paves the way to implementing procedures that would maximize savings since the organisation has no need to pursue benefit from development programmes. Certainly, a non-profit CSO could be deemed not efficient on other grounds, which is arguable and needs to be proved, but its institutional nature still serves as a positive indicator.

On a similar note, the fact that component 1 is co-funded by the European Union and ECES clearly stimulates patterns conducive to achieve high efficiency standards. ECES is not just managing money from others to whom it becomes accountable. ECES is also putting its own resources and therefore attention will be paid to those savings that are compatible with expected goals.

**ECES Human Resources prove to be valuable in terms of project conceptualisation and implementation, but clear rooms for improvement exist in terms of turnover and internal distribution of tasks.**

When it comes to human resources and according to the relevant profiles, ECES staff proves to be knowledgeable. Efficiency is also enhanced as programme outcomes are achieved with a reasonable team.

However, **turnover** raises concern. Four Project Directors / Coordinators have been in place for a total lapse of 35 months from June 2017, that is, one leader for approximately every nine months. Moreover, the current Coordinator acts on a provisional basis pending completion of the recruitment procedure. Such a high turnover rate itself could undermine the efficiency of the whole component. Similar indicators may also be found for the remaining staff in Abuja, where few members remain working for the project from the very beginning. Having in mind this background, maximum attention should be paid to the on-going recruitment so as a proper team stabilization is met till the end of the implementation period.

All four Project Directors / Coordinators proved to be very knowledgeable, but consideration should be given to the fact that substitutions have been requested twice by the EUD mainly due to profiles that would not meet what is required for a managerial position in Nigeria. Given this worrisome record, measures should be taken to ensure that the next Project
Coordinator reverses such situation. In this regard, special consideration should be paid to the managerial, leadership and team building skills of the new Project Coordinator.

Distribution of tasks is a key indicator for assessing efficiency as well. Such criteria will wonder whether ECES internal chart is appropriate and to what extent the distribution of tasks with other stakeholders contributes to a high efficiency.

Regarding ECES organigram, relevant staff works from two main locations: ECES headquarters in Brussels and ECES office in Abuja. While day to day activities are conducted directly from Abuja, it is to note that headquarters are also largely involved in the implementation of component 1. In this regard, headquarters are not supposed to receive just activity reports from the field on a regular basis. Instead, Brussels is also present when certain tasks have to be performed. Among others, relationships with EUD are assumed by Abuja and headquarters jointly.

Solutions for organisational patterns are not universal. They may and should vary from one programme to another and a tailored approach to actual needs is much more important than theoretical perfect formats. However, a permanent follow-up is necessary so as to avoid potential downsides such as an insufficient autonomy of the Abuja team or a lack of real supervision by the headquarters. Soft diplomacy for anticipating needs, which is in line with current ECES operational standards, is always very welcome too.

In this regard, it is to note that evaluators have received contradictory opinions. While direct and visible intervention from headquarters is perceived negatively as a measure that curtails Abuja team’s capacities in such a way that it undermines its credibility vis-à-vis other players, the same fact is also considered as a mechanism that shows full ECES commitment on a proper EUSDGN’s implementation. ECES’ feedback indicates that this is a working modality which complies with a headquarters role that, as contained in ECES’ Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), supports in ensuring needed oversight on project implementation and follow-up geared towards promoting transparency, financial prudence and compliance with all EU Commission’s requirements. This was also communicated to the contracting authority as a means of implementation in the project document, also as is the practice in all ECES implemented projects.

According to these premises, a continuous assessment is to be made grounded on a distinction between the necessary oversight from headquarters and the project implementation as such. Moreover, if we consider that the project has already covered more than a half of its implementation period, autonomy of Abuja team is expected to be higher than the one that existed at the very beginning. Such a final outcome needs to be guaranteed along the remaining implementation period.

Finally, it is to note that the internal governance of the ECES Abuja team was modified when a Project Coordinator was nominated in 2019. A new Project Management Unit (PMU) was created gathering the project coordinator together with the Finance expert, the Senior Project Officer and the Coordination Advisor/Communications expert. While a PMU may facilitate a common understanding of project’s challenges and an enhanced cooperation, such committees could also blur individual duties and undermine hierarchy. Given the abovementioned leadership gaps and turnover rates that the project has encountered so far, how the new Project Coordinator deals with the PMU becomes a key factor for a successful implementation.
Finally, in terms of the economic load of human resources, monitoring reports highlight efficient indicators. The same goes for the total absorption of funds so far. According to the Monitoring Report / Year 2, “about 43% [till June 2019] of the overall budget has been spent” (: 24).

No overlaps have been identified vis-à-vis other implementers. Proactive cooperation and a constant dialogue ensure a smooth project implementation.

Distribution of tasks with other stakeholders is also crucial. A good understanding with the relevant INEC, civil society and EUD interlocutors will facilitate an efficient implementation. In this regard, monthly meetings with all actors, such as the ones that EUD holds, with ECES serving as the Secretariat, improve the coordination and efficiency will be normally enhanced as a logical consequence. Minutes of every meeting prove close attention to all events and quick reactions to unexpected circumstances.

It is to note that general monthly meetings are complemented by other topic-based clusters too. Such sub-platforms enhance coordination among stakeholders addressing common topics and meetings are also organised on a regular basis. All interlocutors highlight the usefulness of such mechanism. Efficiency is clearly improved thereby since overlaps are identified at an early stage and resources from different partners are also gathered and harmonised so as to be implemented for a common goal.

It is also to note that ECES has a leadership role in Abuja. ECES implements component 1, which is pivotal within the EUSDGN since its activities are cross-cutting with most of those undertaken under the four other components. It is therefore important that ECES is able to interact swiftly with all the other implementing organizations, as it has happened so far.

Regarding how joint activities are organised or how information is channelled to main interlocutors, a significant number of activities are jointly organised across five EUSDGN components, that is, activities are implemented with resources coming from different partners. At a first glance, such cooperation is a result of cluster meetings and fully complies with high standards of efficiency. Moreover, beneficiaries, such as INEC or Nigerian citizens in general, will perceive that EU support pursues a unique goal though a formal segmentation in five pillars exists.

However, as it has already been said, joint activities may also blur the emphasis that each component intends to stress. In ECES’ case, a balance is to be sought between maintaining and even strengthening cooperation with other implementing partners and ECES’ special focus on INEC’s internal needs, that is, not just INEC engagement with stakeholders as

56 “The PMU and HQ support, without the consideration of INEC advisors cost, represents 19.44 % of the overall project cost ... An analysis of the cost of ECES Human resources put into perspective with the previous INEC support programme operated by UNDP demonstrates that the cost effectiveness of ECES Human resources policy. In this respect, ECES PMU is budgeted at a reasonable price” (: 4-5 / Monitoring and Evaluation Report Year 1).

57 The report clarifies that, comparing to the first implementation year, “the increase of ECES expenses was due to the upsurge in the number of activities implemented, especially in view of the 2019 General Elections. Out of the 43% spent so far, the expenditures dedicated to the implementation of activities/human resources, over the last two years, amounts to 68.2%, allocated respectively to: 45.9 % implementation of activities per se and 22.3% to Human Resources and technical assistance, mentoring ... In the mid-term period, the rate of ECES disbursement is positive due to the inception phase” (: 24).
such (e.g. organisation of external events), but how INEC prepares itself for these outreach activities (e.g. internal awareness-raising activities, INEC training seminars together with appropriate impact evaluation).

On another note about the communication capacity of INEC and bearing in mind that this is a domain where a lot of factors come in play, the impact of the project on INEC’s communication performance presents a mixed record. Overall INEC’s communication performance was qualified as “poor” at times of elections by some of the interviewees, despite regular briefings particularly after the postponement of the elections. The 2019 EU EOM final report emphasizes such assessment as well. It is not therefore clear that the Communication Strategy put in place yielded positive results and contributed thereby to a higher efficiency.

Efficiency differ a lot depending on the activity of the work plan

In this regard, it is worth paying attention to output 1.1 (INEC strategic planning, policy framework and operational capacity are strengthened) that is in close relation to outcome 1 (effective mechanisms for internal functioning of INEC). The work plan foresees as the first activity the provision of high-level technical advisory experts and a technical unit for the INEC’s Chairman comprising a Chief Technical Adviser, a Special Adviser and a Chief Press Secretary to the Chair.

INEC’s performance, as any other electoral body worldwide, needs in-house expertise and a technical / research unit will always enhance efficiency. Such task forces normally operate aligned with sectorial units that will be in charge of field activities. Advisors feed such activities with innovative and mid- / long-term approaches. On a similar way, the main institutional responsible will benefit from strategic advices that lead to systemic updates.

As already said in the sections devoted to relevance and effectiveness, the technical team proved to be a positive mechanism to bring in expertise that INEC lacked. Interlocutors also highlight that the team facilitates interaction between implementing partners and INEC units. Such positive outcome should be maintained, but attention should be also paid to the fact that the current structure may have collateral effects. While the advisers provide an effective day to day contribution to the work of the Commissioners, the modalities of their embedment in INEC if not properly institutionalised may not only have little transformative effect on the Commission, but could lead to a doubtful impact on its internal operation. Immediate effectiveness and impact could be contradictory with efficiency and institutional consolidation on the long-term.

Mixtures of advisory and executive roles, grey areas from an accountability perspective or a limited empowerment of INEC Directorates could also result on a low efficient outcome as well as prevent a horizontal ownership and self-confidence of all INEC units. In general terms, expertise should come from all across INEC units and supports from niches, such as the current technical team, should be seen just as a temporary bridge for this spread internal excellence.

In this regard, several interviewees referred to the lack of clarity on the exact role of the technical team in the internal INEC processes; in particular, it was noted that at some points advisers were acting as executives and decision-makers, blurring the lines of responsibilities, notably with respect to the mandate of the Directors of departments. Some of the implementers of other components of EUSDGN have noted that there is no well-
established, streamlined, channel of communication with INEC, but rather a plurality of interlocutors depending on the context and issues. From an institution building perspective, this situation does not contribute to the construction of a solid electoral administration.

Moreover, embedded people, that is, experts paid by external entities, but working daily as local civil servants, could blur the roles initially given to the local beneficiary, which is INEC in our case, and the implementing partner, that is, ECES, who is in charge and responsible for all activities, including those of embedded people.

Assessments to be made on a regular basis could permit to determine how the Chairman’s technical team may contribute the most to a higher efficiency of INEC and relevant measures could be adopted accordingly. If we assume that the advisers provide a valuable, characterised as “indispensable” by one of them and by the EUD, contribution to the work of the Commissioners and particularly its Chair, some mechanisms should be put in place to integrate financially and institutionally this expertise within the INEC. This would firstly mean supporting a revision of the organigram of INEC to integrate the expert team. While it is clearly understood from the advisers themselves that their performance is closely linked to the fact that “they are not part of the bureaucracy”, and that therefore the creation of an additional directorate would not be a preferred solution, the establishment of an “advisory office”, whatever the name, clearly enshrined into a revised organigram of INEC, should be encouraged.

Particular attention should also be paid to reports since such documents reflect the added value of the technical team. Having in mind the remaining lapse till the end of the project, quarterly reporting, as foreseen in the programme, would be an efficient and not cumbersome measure instead of annual deadlines, which is the current praxis.

Accountability would be enhanced thereby too. In this regard, it is to note that on the paper the accountability seems diluted between the three parties involved. Indeed, the contracts that they have signed with ECES provide that the advisers must “regularly inform the Hon. Chairman of INEC, the Client and ECES of the progress in the executions of the tasks”, “are responsible for the submission in due time of reports and outputs” and “all reports […] must be submitted directly to the Hon. Chairman of INEC, the Client and copied to ECES”. In practice, while formally paid by ECES, who signs, among other documents, their relevant timesheets, they appear as responding firstly to the Chairman of INEC. As recalled by the audit firm (see below), there is insufficient documentation of their work (: 18).

Assessment of the contribution of the technical team to the enhancement of INEC’s capacity can also be considered from the value for money criterion. It is noted that this action alone represents around 8% of the overall budget allocated to component one of EUSDGN. It also represents a high percentage of funds allocated for human resources.

At this stage, the efficiency of such project structuration may be questioned and the final evaluation of the project will have to consider, particularly in the light of possible future electoral support project, whether this is the most efficient way to provide high level expertise to INEC (see as well below under impact and sustainability).

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58 According to monitoring reports, “questions arose about the cost of the INEC’ Chair advisors which represents 33,8% of the planned human resources expenditures and 41,03% of the human resources budget spent over the last year ... There is also a question about the disproportion of funds allocated to 3 INEC advisors in comparison with proportion of funds allocated to 14 PMU permanent members” (: 3 / Monitoring and Evaluation Report / Year 1)
Moreover, the comparatively high salaries paid to the three advisers contribute to create a specific group of people within the institution, a kind of cell standing on its own which is not enshrined into the organigram and pay-scale of INEC.

Financial assessments, either internal reports or external audits, have been undertaken thereby ensuring full compliance with EU financial rules. The breakdown of expenses dedicated to the overall budget planned for the 6 ECES outputs shows that ECES activities have increased during the year 2 (see figure 1) for responding to the 2019 General Elections needs. The absorption of funds demonstrates ECES financial management capacity to respond quickly to INEC needs. In addition, the breakdown of expenses shows that ECES has focused on strengthening of INEC Strategic planning, policy framework and operational capacity (Output 1) in particular with the operationalisation of the EMSC tool (14.9 % of the output planned budget). Efficiency is enhanced.

![Expenditures and Overall Budget (EUR)](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Expenditures dedicated to ECES outputs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O1: INEC Strategy &amp; Planning</td>
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<td>O2: INEC Capacity for inter communication</td>
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<td>O3: INEC Periodic Voter Registration</td>
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<td>O4: INEC Oversight of Political Parties</td>
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<td>O5: INEC Alternate Dispute Resolution</td>
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<td>06: FOSIECON Instutional Capacity</td>
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<td>Total Expenditures cumulated until 06/2019</td>
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<td>Total Expenditures 06/2018 to 06/2019</td>
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<td>Total Overall Budget</td>
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Component 1 has already been submitted to a financial audit by an external firm. Such supervisions are always welcome as means for the early detection of malpractices and areas of improvement. Financial management is a key indicator for the overall programme’s efficiency. The report highlights different areas where improvement might be envisaged, what is of great importance for the remaining implementation time.

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59 For instance, in terms of ECES structuration, “on average, the salary of one INEC advisor is 3 times higher than the salary of PMU member. As regard the inventory of ECES interventions, it is difficult to see the cost effectiveness of such financial arrangements.” (: 3 / Monitoring and Evaluation Report / Year 1)
Beyond audit considerations about the role of technical team, which are fully aligned with what has been said so far, other findings shed light over improvements on efficiency, such accountancy issues that were ranked as priority 1. The report suggests, and ECES agreed and already implemented, that using the same software both in Brussels and Abuja would be beneficious though no discrepancy had been found. Such issue relates to what has been discussed above regarding how a proper distribution of tasks between both teams is to be found. As recalled by the audit firm, it is a “way of building the capacity of the Project Management Unit” (: 21). It is to note that the recommendation has already been addressed, which is a positive indicator.

Beyond the external audit, ECES interim financial reports show that program’s implementation adheres to normal efficiency parameters, but consideration should be given to the fact that a number of activities have not been launched yet, such as all actions related to voter registration or, as already highlighted, activities aiming at assessing INEC human resources management, which are included in the working plan, but not in the one approved till end 2020. Time still exists to implement the whole working plan, but, in terms of efficiency, careful attention should be paid because tight calendars are normally bad environments for efficient procedures.

Finally, value for money criterion intends to merge efficiency, effectiveness and actual impact of a development program. In terms of efficiency, savings, which are always welcome, should be compatible with sound outcomes, that is, efficiency cannot become the sole parameter to be met because exaggerated economies could easily result in poor achievements and therefore the whole institutional effort would be vain.

Having in mind this analytical framework, there is no indicator leading to an incompatibility between efficiency and actual results. Savings or alternative implementation procedures have been duly considered, but none of such measures seems to reduce the quality of the final outcome.

Conclusions / efficiency

C19 / The partnership between ECES and EU is funded upon solid bases that enhance efficiency. Co-funded projects as well as non-profit actors pave the path for such a positive cost-efficient outcome.

C20 / ECES Human Resources prove to be valuable in terms of project conceptualization and implementation, but clear rooms for improvement exist in terms of turnover and internal distribution of tasks. The fact that at the time of this report there is no resident Project Director or Coordinator provides the opportunity to draw the lessons from the first half of the project and assess how to provide the project with a stable and fully empowered field management and leadership.

C21 / Efficiency differ a lot depending on the activity of the work plan. The modalities of the embedment of the technical team in INEC if not properly institutionalised may not only have little transformative effect on the Commission but could lead to a doubtful impact on its internal operation and its institutional consolidation on the long-term. Having in mind the central role of this action within EUSDGN / component 1, efficiency is therefore questionable. Moreover, cost-efficiency raises important concerns when consideration is given to their salaries.
C22 / According to 2019 EU EOM, INEC communications praxis, either internal or external, showed important weaknesses. Despite component 1 pays particular attention to such topic and bearing in mind that the impact of international development programme may be limited due to local constraints, it is to note that the efficiency of ECES activities intending to enhance INEC communications capabilities remains limited.

C23 / Financial assessments, either internal reports or external audits, have been undertaken thereby ensuring full compliance with EU financial rules. Efficiency is also enhanced through ECES internal operational standards.
5 – Impact

The impact criterion is intended to measure the extent to which the intervention has generated or is expected to generate significant positive or negative, intended or unintended, higher-level effects. It particularly looks into the transformative effects of the intervention, those that are longer term or broader in scope than those already captured under the effectiveness criterion.

EQ5: To what extent the ECES support to INEC has already brought some changes which can be measured against the 2019 elections?

When attempting to assess the impact of the project at this time, several preliminary considerations are necessary.

Preliminary consideration 1: the present evaluation is a mid-term evaluation. It will therefore remain cautious in its conclusions on this criterion and will primarily seek to identify areas where, given the current perspectives and the lessons learnt from the 2019 elections, actions should, or could, be intensified, amended or introduced to serve a greater impact of the intervention.

Preliminary consideration 2: it is necessary to recognize the vastness of some of the issues to be tackled in areas where progress is by nature slow. The fact that only four out of the thirty recommendations made by the 2015 EU EOM were implemented before the 2019 elections illustrates the magnitude of the issues.

Preliminary consideration 3: the context within which INEC operates is also an important factor of success and/or failure. This was highlighted by several interviewees. The 2019 EU EOM Final Report notes that INEC “worked in a complex security and politically-charged environment, with its premises and officials subject to physical attacks and intimidation”. On the instance of the disappointing voter participation, some interviewees noted that the political environment was less conducive to a higher voter participation in 2019 than it was in 2015, including the last minute postponement of the election, the failure to pass the amended electoral law, the overall lesser respect for the rule of law and the shrinking civic space. In other words, success or failure of the project to provide transformative effects measurable at the time of the elections do not solely depend on the project implementation.

Preliminary consideration 4: it is appropriate for such a project to take into account the political sensitivity of the domain it covers, pushing any international partner to find a path to provide expertise without showing interference. For this reason, expectations in terms of impact should remain limited.

The activities delivered address the 2015 EU EOM recommendations, in particular the need to strengthen INEC organisational and operational planning and internal communication (recommendation 2), INEC communication capacity and notably its ability to provide with full transparency and immediately all information of public interest (recommendation 3), the continuation of biometric identification checks of voters and collection of voter cards (recommendations 4 and 5), enhancement of INEC capacities to exert oversight on political parties (recommendations 10 and 11), reinforcement of INEC

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60 See EU Election Observation Mission, Nigeria 2019, Final Report
61 EU EOM 2019 General Elections in Nigeria, Final Report, p.3
capacities in settling electoral disputes (recommendation 22) and in prosecuting electoral offenses (recommendation 26). The Report of the 2015 EU EOM also notes that women participation remains limited, with respect to both international and national targets.

By contrast, evaluators noted that ECES narrative reports, the second one in particular, pay less attention than expected to the 2019 general elections. There are of course activities related to the elections, such as the logistic conference, and in general all tasks are conceived to facilitate the organisation of the elections, but at some point, the EUSDGN activities seem to run in parallel, that is, a huge effort is made in terms of training, policy drafting and equipment, but further evaluations are not made on how such measures impact and are directly related to given elections, either off-cycle or general. Assumption is made that all activities have a certain interaction with the organisation of elections, but such linkage could be made more apparent. INEC’s commitment in EUSDGN activities would also be much more reflected in the overall electoral scenario.

In this context, the actions implemented have already achieved a result and made a contribution to the enhancement of INEC in several domains. Key areas are:

- The upgrading of the Election Management System into a Centre (EMSC), with the introduction of more indicators and the increased sophistication of the tool.
- The establishment of a Media Monitoring Centre, which is a totally new development for INEC.
- The engagement of INEC with the National Assembly on a review of the Electoral Law, also a new development in the Nigerian electoral context.

In some other areas, the expected impact of the project is conditioned by legislative changes; this is particularly the case of INEC capacity to exert oversight on political parties and of the improvement of the electoral disputes’ resolution mechanism. In this respect, the support given by ECES to the dialogue between INEC and the National Assembly on legal reforms is welcome.

However, a few remarks should be made about areas where a lot of activities have already been implemented, with the view of contributing to ensuring a result at the end of the project, in the light of the 2019 EU EOM report.

The 2019 EU EOM report notes that the organisational and operational capacity within INEC still needs to be considerably strengthened and that the planning, tracking, and the required human and material resources needed for timely and accountable operations must be improved. The internal communication within INEC also needs to be improved (recommendation 3) as well as its public communication (recommendation 5). The

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62 Annual Narrative Report / Year Two, June 7, 2018 - June 6, 2019 (: 19-20)
63 EU EOM 2019 General Elections in Nigeria, Final Report, Recommendation 3: “Priority recommendation: Organisational and operational capacity within INEC be considerably strengthened. Improve planning, tracking, and the required human and material resources needed for timely and accountable operations. In addition, improve internal communication within INEC”.
64 EU EOM 2019 General Elections in Nigeria, Final Report, Recommendation 5: “INEC increases consultation with stakeholders, including more frequent meetings with political parties centrally and at state level, especially during the election period. In addition, press conferences be regularly and consistently held, particularly before and after election day. INEC improves strategic communication on incidents and crises, through early press conferences and statements including on electoral security issues”.
The report also notes an overall decline in voter participation and particularly in women participation.

**Firstly**, a review of the focus of the trainings with the view of continuing to strengthen INEC’s capacities should be conducted. As already noted, the staff capacity audit and needs assessment of the Commission Department and Units, which, according to the project document, was planned “to determine competency level, training requirements, and development of targeted trainings” (1.1.3) was not conducted, what reduces the capacity of the project to bring change.

**Secondly**, the evaluators have noted that within the EUSDGN, training and/or outreach activities targeting the same groups are provided for in other components, while under the output “INEC engagement mechanisms with stakeholders enhanced” (1.2.2), ECES has supported some outreach/engagement activities of the same nature. This does not question all the activities conducted under these headings, since some of them were useful in the short term (and requested by INEC - see above under “effectiveness”). Although it is understood that these activities are discussed with INEC and in PTC meetings before implementation, it is important to ensure that the internal capacity of INEC to engage with these various stakeholders is strengthened on these occasions so that these activities have the transformative impact on the Commission which is at the core of the objectives of component 1.

**Thirdly**, while INEC is no longer under the pressure of the preparation of general elections, as it is the case for the remaining time of the project, emphasis on capacity building of INEC should be a priority. Along this line, it is noted that no activities were conducted under specific objectives 1.2.4 (establishment of a civic and voter education harmonization platform) and 1.2.5 (training of the staff in charge of the INEC Contact Centre). Moreover, on a few instances, documents indicate that ECES has been acting more in a substitution mode than for capacity building. The transformative impact of such an approach is limited.

**Fourthly**, regarding voter participation, was the analysis of the factors which can persuade people to go and vote thoroughly conducted? Is voter education the panacea? Some interviewees suggested that in Nigeria the perception that there is integrity and transparency is a much stronger driver of voter participation.

**Conclusions / Impact**

**C24** / The actions implemented at mid-term of the project have already achieved results and to the enhancement of INEC’s institutional capacity. The 2019 EU EOM Report provides useful indications to identify ways to further contribute to ensuring a result at the end of the project. This includes conducting staff capacity audits and needs assessments, ensuring that the internal capacity of INEC to engage with the various stakeholders is strengthened on the occasion of outreach activities supported by ECES, strengthening the institutional framework by notably establishing a civic and voter education harmonization platform and training the staff in charge of the INEC Contact Centre. While voter education, as conducted, has shown its own limitations, an enhanced INEC might help to provide the expected perception of integrity and transparency conducive to a higher voter participation.

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65 This is the case, for instance, when ECES itself produced 5 mini-movies, 5 animations and 5 jingles under the specific objective “Support to innovative voter and education outreach”
6 – Sustainability

The sustainability criterion is intended to measure the extent to which the net benefits of the intervention continue, or are likely to continue without any donor’s support, and in this particular case, the examination of the financial and institutional capacities of the system needed to sustain the net benefits over time.

The previous remarks regarding the limits of an assessment at mid-term of a project are even more relevant when addressing the sustainability criterion. The analysis will therefore highlight only a few aspects, and, at this stage, will be undertaken from the angles of institution and capacity building.

EQ6: To what extent the actions are bringing transformations which are likely to be upheld without donor’s support?

Regarding the institution building benefit, there are obvious questions regarding the sustainability of the action aiming at providing high level advisory electoral expertise to INEC, implemented by the embedment of the three experts in INEC.

The project has been designed to continue the provision of expertise to the Chair of INEC thanks to international funding, a situation which has existed for some years under the former UNDP run election support project. If we assume that the advisers provide a valuable - characterised as “indispensable” by one of them and by the EUD - contribution to the work of the Commissioners and particularly its Chair, the issue is how to ensure that this action continues without donor’s support, enhancing both the capacity and the autonomy of INEC.

The sustainability of the action itself is fragile: a note on the “Implication of potential leadership change in INEC in November 2020” confirms the close, quasi-personal, link between the Chair and the advisers. This might be inevitable, but this should not prevent that the positions are embodied in the organigram of INEC and given some permanence whoever are the holders of the position. Even if the advisers are to be considered as part of the Office of the Chair and come and go with her/him, there should be some provisions to ensure some form of continuity.

Beyond this structural concern, consideration should be given to financial sustainability of this specific activity on a mid- and long-term perspective, both from the point of view of international development assistance and INEC budgetary capacities.

This analysis is fully consistent with the findings of the 2016 EU final evaluation of previous UNDP projects: “the sustainability of working through consultants to the chair was limited and did not get adequate buy-in from civil service staff for restructuring and institutionalising changes sought in key process that had support from the projects. Reform of INEC is thus incomplete”.

Regarding the capacity building benefit, three issues could already be addressed.

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66 Note prepared by the project management: “Implication of potential leadership change in INEC in November 2020”
Firstly, how much the work done by the three advisers to INEC Chair will enhance the expertise and competence of future commissions? To what extent is it possible to ensure that expertise and accumulated knowledge provided by the technical team radiate within the Commission and remain available to future Commissioners, and when relevant, to INEC staff? When interviewed the advisers have highlighted that their work is documented and will be compiled in a guidebook left for future Commissioners. It is suggested here that, for the sake of sustainability, the actions undertaken to enhance the library of INEC benefit from the work of the advisers and that some form of bridge is built between the two actions. Alternatively, the Electoral Institute, whose mandate covers research, could be the recipient of the work done by the advisers.

Secondly, how effective on the long-term are the trainings? Numerous trainings for different categories of INEC staff have been conducted by the project and by nature such trainings are short duration exercises. How much will remain after months and years have passed? The project does not include provisions for testing the staff following training sessions. As already mentioned, the action provided for in the project document to conduct a “staff capacity audit and needs assessment of INEC Departments and Units to determine competency level, training requirements, and development of targeted trainings” has not been implemented. This could have given a stronger basis to the training activities, ensuring a more targeted and substantiated approach. Combining the audits and needs assessment with post training testing would enhance the sustainability of the capacity building component of the project.

The same goes for the baseline study on PWDs, which was not conducted. Although in that very case a manual was developed by another implementing partner – the Albino Foundation – with technical inputs from ECES, and designed and printed thanks to ECES’ contribution, one can suggest that conducting the study could leave INEC with greater understanding, more documented knowledge of the situation of PWDs and, most certainly, an enhanced ownership of its policy towards this marginalized group of voters, allowing for future INEC driven initiatives as the situation evolves.

Along these lines, and in addition to these possibilities, the project could repeat some of the training based on lessons learned from the 2019 elections to help ensuring that the acquired skills are more deeply ingrained. The project could then move towards the concept of continuous education of the INEC staff in order to avoid in the future the “single shot” aspect of some of the trainings. Ideally, INEC could be equipped at the end of the project with a higher internal capacity in charge of the continuous training for its staff, presumably within the Electoral Institute. In such a context, INEC would be less dependent on external expertise for training its own staff; rather than being done within a time-limited project, such as component 1 of EU SDGN, it would be fully embedded as part of the regular human resources management policy of INEC.

Thirdly, how sustainable is the EMSC at this phase of the project? While EMSC is seen as a valuable achievement of the project (see effectiveness and impact above), there are some fragilities: EMSC has a limited number of staff on a permanent basis and increased staffing had to be temporarily provided at the time of the 2019 elections coming from different units of the INEC. The EMSC is run by a consultant paid by the project, while its strategic management is in the hands of a sub-committee chaired by one of the advisers, also paid by the project. The simple question is: what will happen when the project comes to an end? At the same time, some interviewees underline that the buy-in by several of the
Directors is weak, giving no insurance that the permanent management of INEC is fully committed to the EMSC.

**Conclusions / sustainability**

**C25** / The sustainability of the actions aiming at providing high level advisory expertise to INEC and at operating the EMSC is questionable, as they rest nearly exclusively on international support without mechanisms to ensure their institutional and financial integration within the Commission.

**C26** / The sustainability of trainings and of some outreach activities could be enhanced by conducting the baseline studies which were initially foreseen and by further developing the internal training capacities of INEC.
7 – EU / ECES added value

EQ7: To what extent the Action brings additional benefits to what would have resulted from Member States’ interventions only in the partner country? / To what extent ECES involvement represents an improvement compared to previous and current implementers?

The added value of the program is to be drawn from a comparison between its current implementation and what existed beforehand. Such exercise will allow us to identify those aspects where new actors and/or new procedures have contributed, whether positive or not, to the Nigerian electoral framework and to INEC’s capacity building in particular.

The EUSDGN inaugurates a new format for EU support to Nigeria that brings more visibility and higher EU engagement

In 2017, the European Union inaugurated a new approach when designing how to support electoral reforms in Nigeria. While it used to participate in a basket fund managed by the UNDP, a bilateral agreement was signed enabling a direct relationship between EU and local entities. As already said above, the program Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria (SDGN) is running from 2017 to 2022 and its first component, which deals with INEC institutional capacity and credibility, is managed by ECES. Despite its broad experience in electoral assistance programmes, ECES had no previous interventions in Nigeria.

Having in mind this new scenario, a first and easy conclusion indicates that EU visibility could be much higher now than it was with the UNDP basket fund. A quick overview to the communication policy of both component 1 and the overall EUSDGN together with evidence retrieved from social networks and interlocutors confirm that EU’s institutional visibility has clearly become an added value, which is at least important for the EU itself. Similar conclusions may apply to ECES as well.

However, beyond the positive consideration that such findings deserve, consideration can also be given to the balance between visibility and substantial results. A biased approach that would prioritise visibility may undermine both EU and ECES’ credibility. Certain evidence, such as the length of visibility issues in some reports that break down to the minimum detail how EU and ECES will be visible (e.g. business cards, institutional headings, website layout etc.) or feedback retrieved from certain interlocutors go in such sense and attention should be paid to accordingly. Therefore, ECES’ and/or EU’s visibility should never hide the substance of the actions that have been undertaken. In this regard, particular consideration should be given on how large events are organised and how new actions are launched since both moments are very sensitive in terms of visibility and therefore its balance with content might be on the skids.

Continuity and innovation are present in EUSDGN program.

If a comparison is made between UNDP and EU / ECES activities, a continuous strategy is found. While there are some innovative approaches, many activities continue what had already been launched by UNDP, which is rather positive because electoral assistance cannot re-start and apply new paradigms every time the donor changes. The added value should rather be found in how activities have been improved, after the relevant assessment of previous performance, and what the balance between continuation and innovation is. In
In this regard, a program that is limited to merely continue previous patterns with no changes would be a bad symptom.

Firstly, it is to note that previous activities have been re-launched and improved. The integration of management tools within a broader EMSC or an updated communications policy may serve as evidence. Secondly, innovative actions also exist, as already stated above.

However, given that there are more than two years remaining, there is still room for emphasizing EU / ECES innovative approaches taking advantage of pending activities already foreseen in the working plan. In this regard, the enhancement of INEC’s ownership together with a narrower focus on certain topics could be a clear added value of EU / ECES involvement. The fact that many activities need to be maintained from UNDP times proves that external support is not really achieving its main goal and INEC continues to rely upon such tools without a clear internal re-organization (e.g. three advisors with a grey institutional accountability or a management tool that still depends on external consultants). Therefore, EU / ECES added value may be reflected by new activities, but mainly by the way to address the mid- and long-term evolution of electoral support, that is, how to institutionalize what has been done so far.

**ECES profile brings new methodologies and a versatile approach to local needs.**

On another note, ECES profile makes an important difference as well. While UNDP is a big organisation dealing with several topics, ECES is an election-focused entity. While UNDP is a huge body with a complex internal decision-making, ECES can react faster to unexpected events and therefore tailor the activities to the actual needs and different conjunctures. On the other hand, UNDP has a longer experience and has been working in a broader array of countries worldwide. However, ECES’ portfolio, although being a rather new entity, already provides evidence of substantial actions undertaken in many countries.

**No overlaps have been identified regarding EU member states**

Finally, EU added value should be assessed vis-à-vis the activities that EU member states are also undertaking in Nigeria by their own. In this regard, evaluators could identify two actions funded by Germany and United Kingdom. Moreover, among other European states, Norway has also funded UNDP activities.

Having in mind this landscape, the evaluation of European Union’s added value should be assessed vis-à-vis two projects, the German and, beyond Brexit consequences, the British one. While the German project was rather small and was also managed by ECES, the British one is larger and it intends to strengthen INEC’s performance. Therefore, a common target exists between EUSDGN component 1 and the British support though no problematic overlaps have been spotted. Moreover, a cooperation already exists and further exchanges are expected in the remaining implementation time.

Finally, given that some activities are jointly organised by ECES and other implementing partners, consideration should be given to the fact that ECES is one of the few international actors whereas most of the other ones are local civil society organizations. Such profile should lead to cooperation schemas where ECES is intended to provide ordinary support, but also its own international and comparative experience. As reflected in the narrative
reports, this has been the case for certain activities, such as BRDGE and namely LEAD seminars.

**Conclusions / EU / ECES added value**

**C27** / The EUSDGN inaugurates a **new format** for EU support to Nigeria that brings more visibility and higher EU engagement. The project appears to enjoy a high level of **visibility** as a component of the EU-SDGN but also on its own merits. It contributes to the high profile of the EU in electoral support in Nigeria.

**C28** / **Continuity** and **innovation** are present in the EU SDGN program thereby taking advantage of previous achievements and adding specific new methodologies.

**C29** / ECES electoral background and experience in other countries allow EU SDGN to bring in **new methodologies** and a **versatile approach** to local needs.

**C30** / No overlaps have been identified regarding EU member states
V – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The specific conditions under which this mid-term evaluation was conducted, not permitting a field visit, have nevertheless allowed the evaluators to gather a wide range of information provided by a large number of interviews (see annex 6), including of four National Commissioners, the three Advisers to the Chair, two INEC Directors, the Electoral Institute’s Director General, the EU Ambassador to Nigeria, the Head of Cooperation and the Program Manager at the EU Delegation to Nigeria, as well as the Heads of most of the implementing organisations of components 2 to 5 of the EU SDGN and former electoral Experts from the EEMs to Nigeria, in 2014 and 2018, and the EU EOMs, in 2015 and 2019. There were several interactions with the ECES team in Abuja and the ECES Headquarters in Brussels. Among international development partners, IFES representatives in Nigeria have also been interviewed.

This has given the evaluators a fair view of the state of the implementation of the project under component 1 of EUSDGN. There are clearly some strong points in the ECES intervention in Nigeria but also some points which deserve attention and could be easily amended / improved in the remaining part of the project.

5.1 Conclusions

Regarding relevance,

C1 / The project is based on a solid analysis of the electoral situation in Nigeria, particularly the report and recommendations of the EU Electoral Observation Mission of 2015, and has benefitted from the experience of the EU which had been engaged in electoral support in Nigeria for years under different settings. The design and focus of the actions are firmly aligned with INEC priorities too.

C2 / Conditions exist for a completion of the project during the remaining implementation period though a definitive re-evaluation of evolving needs is necessary. While at mid-term of the project, the 2019 general elections provided the opportunity to revise the work plan and adapt the interventions to take stock of the lessons learnt. An update was agreed and carried out shortly after the elections, but a deeper revision using as a baseline all reports from the 2019 elections, particularly that of INEC, when available, would be useful.

C3 / Nigerian stakeholders are committed to a successful implementation of the project by undertaking joint activities and mobilizing targeted audiences. However, local ownership is still not completed and therefore activities for the second half will play a crucial role in this regard. Special consideration should be given to all baseline studies foreseen by the work plan and the SWOT analysis of INEC staff.

C4 / The non-performance of activities provided in the project document in the area of voter registration may indicate that the assessment of their feasibility, or of the desire of the beneficiary to welcome international engagement in this sensitive domain was not fully considered at the time of the drafting of the project document.

C5 / Some activities that were already active during the previous development programmes show limited improvements on INEC institutional autonomy. This evaluation has allowed to identify some issues which are beyond the control of ECES, at the implementing stage of the project, and come from the design of the project itself. In particular, this is the case of the provision of internationally funded expertise in positions which are regarded as essential for the
operation of the Commission. While this high-level expertise is welcome, such provision without mechanisms to consolidate it into the fabric of the Commission is problematic. A primary instance is the **technical team of advisers to the Chair** of INEC. This action is the continuation of an international support which was provided under a previous project.

**C6** / The Election Management Support Centre (EMSC) constitutes another example where continuity exists from previous international supports but, despite significant improvements have been made in their format and operation system, INEC autonomy remains low for running alone such tool.

**Regarding coherence**

**C7** / The programme continues the support activities undertaken by **previous international development programs** and builds upon lessons learned from 2015 General Elections. While consistency is kept by maintaining certain activities, ECES work combines consideration to past programmes with certain **innovative measures** in terms of training methodology, outreach activities or INEC inclusiveness with local players.

**C8** / The project is **coherently articulated** with other interventions in the same domain. This is the case within the EUSDGN. There is a working coordination mechanism among the five components, under the leadership of the EU Delegation, and there is a number of examples of collaboration between ECES and the implementers of the other components.

**C9** / Cooperation with other international stakeholders exists thereby enhancing the overall coherence of international development programmes in Nigeria. **No significant overlaps** have been identified.

**C10** / INEC outreach activities and **INEC in-house expertise** are complementary goals that need different means to be achieved. While INEC is supposed to enhance awareness on electoral issues and partnerships with civil society organizations play a crucial in this regard, INEC also pays attention to internal empowerment. EUSDGN component 1 combines both angles, but in general terms the first half of programme implementation, and namely output 1.2, has emphasized those activities that reverted directly to stakeholders.

**Regarding effectiveness,**

**C11** / Once it reached its cruising speed, by the fall of 2017, the project has conducted a remarkably high number of activities. In a context marked by the mounting pressure of the preparation of the 2019 elections, ECES has been praised for its capacity to respond swiftly to the requests of INEC, with flexibility and a goodwill which has been unanimously recognised. ECES is commanded for bringing high level experts and, in comparison to previous projects, an innovative approach.

**C12** / **Achievements** comprise an EMSC with a broader scope, outreach activities, such as several successful youth campus awareness-raising events, liaison initiatives with legal practitioners and new mechanisms for political parties and media monitoring.

**C 13 / A special attention should be paid to the effectiveness of the provision of three experts** who act as advisers to the Chairman of INEC. An assessment is needed to determine whether what “seems to be a good and inevitable idea on the paper”, according to one of our interviewees, is achieving the expected results. Positioned next to the Commission’s Chair, it can be expected that their contribution is particularly essential on the most sensitive issues.
C14 / The modalities of the support to the EMSC do not ensure the consolidation of the internationally supported expertise in the operation of INEC. This central element of the Commission rests upon the input of a technical expert under the impulse of one of the advisers to the Chair. Efforts to associate in a structured manner several directors of departments in the remaining time of the project could help to mend the current situation.

C15 / While the INEC report on the 2019 elections is not yet available, a limited update of the workplan has been conducted shortly after the elections. However, some further internal reflection on the effectiveness of the activities undertaken so far in the light of the elections would be welcome. Objectives should be re-discussed with INEC and eventually revisited for the second part of the project implementation.

C16 / Activities regarding voter education could be revisited, with the view of narrowing the current scope and prioritizing some issues, particularly activities in favour of women participation. ECES could contribute to identify these issues, including with reference to the findings of the EUEOM, EFM and EEM (if available) on this point.

C17 / ECES could envision to multiply the effectiveness of the youth outreach activities by organising the events not only in different types of educational institutions, such as Colleges and Polytechnics schools, but also in more States. To maximize the impact on INEC as well, the modality of organising technical committee meetings involving INEC staff from the headquarters and states as was obtainable during the implementation of these activities should be sustained to ensure maximum impact.

C18 / Attention should be paid to some of the activities which were not conducted. Interviews have confirmed that this is because INEC had no appetite for them. However, it should be noted that while some of them can be detached from the rest of the agreed workplan and their non-achievement may not impact the effectiveness of other actions (e.g. the support to voter registration), this is not the case of all of them. Not conducting needs assessments and baselines studies has the potential of undermining the effectiveness of trainings.

Regarding efficiency
C19 / The partnership between ECES and EU is funded upon solid bases that enhance efficiency. Co-funded projects as well as non-profit actors pave the path for such a positive cost-efficient outcome.

C20 / ECES Human Resources prove to be valuable for project conceptualization and implementation, but clear rooms for improvement exist in terms of turnover and internal distribution of tasks. The fact that at the time of this report there is no resident Project Director or Coordinator provides the opportunity to draw the lessons from the first half of the project and assess how to provide the project with a stable and fully empowered field management and leadership.

C21 / Efficiency differ a lot depending on the activity of the work plan. The modalities of the embedment of the technical team in INEC if not properly institutionalised may not only have little transformative effect on the Commission but could lead to a doubtful impact on its internal operation and its institutional consolidation on the long-term. Having in mind the central role of this action within EU SDGN / component 1, efficiency is therefore questionable. Moreover, cost-efficiency raises important concerns when consideration is given to their salaries.

C22 / According to 2019 EU EOM, INEC communications praxis, either internal or external, showed important weaknesses. Despite component 1 pays particular attention to such topic and bearing in mind that the impact of international development programme may be limited due to local constraints, it is to note that the efficiency of ECES activities intending to enhance INEC communications capabilities remains limited.

C23 / Financial assessments, either internal reports or external audits, have been undertaken thereby ensuring full compliance with EU financial rules. Efficiency is also enhanced through ECES internal operational standards.

Regarding impact
C24 / The actions implemented at mid-term of the project have already achieved results and contributed to the enhancement of INEC institutional capacity. The 2019 EU EOM Report provides useful indications to identify ways to further contribute to ensuring a result at the end of the project. This includes conducting staff capacity audits and needs assessments, ensuring that the internal capacity of INEC to engage with the various stakeholders is strengthened on the occasion of outreach activities supported by ECES, strengthening the institutional framework by notably establishing a civic and voter education harmonization platform and training the staff in charge of the INEC Contact Centre. While voter education, as conducted, has shown its own limitations, an enhanced INEC might help to provide the expected perception of integrity and transparency conducive to a higher voter participation.

Regarding sustainability
C25 / The sustainability of the actions aiming at providing high level advisory expertise to INEC and at operating the EMSC is questionable, as they rest nearly exclusively on international support without mechanisms to ensure their institutional and financial integration within the Commission.

C26 / The sustainability of trainings and of some outreach activities could be enhanced by conducting the baseline studies which were initially foreseen and by further developing the internal training capacities of INEC.

Regarding EU / ECES added value
C27 / The EU SDGN inaugurates a new format for EU support to Nigeria that brings more visibility and higher EU engagement. The project appears to enjoy a high level of visibility as a component of the EUSDGN but also on its own merits. It contributes to the high profile of the EU in electoral support in Nigeria.

C28 / Continuity and innovation are present in the EUSDGN program thereby taking advantage of previous achievements and adding specific new methodologies.

C29 / ECES electoral background and experience in other countries allow EUSDGN to bring in new methodologies and a versatile approach to local needs.

C30 / No overlaps have been identified regarding EU member states.
5.2 Recommendations

As part of the report, the evaluators propose a set of recommendations, based on the above-mentioned key findings, for the remaining period of implementation of the project.

Table 3: Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Corresponding conclusion(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1/ Reinforce ECES local management by notably 1/ reducing the turnover in Abuja starting with the position of Project Director/Coordinator, whose recruitment should be sped up and based on a sound managerial profile; 2/ granting a larger autonomy to the resident Project Director/Coordinator together with a clear hierarchy and distribution of tasks within the local team.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2/ Speed up the post 2019 general elections assessments based on 2019 EU EOM Final Report as well as INEC definitive feedback and report. Readjust the working plan till 2022 as needed. Recommendations from EU EFM and EEM should also be taken into consideration.</td>
<td>2, 15, 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3/ Ensure that the tasks conducted by the INEC Chairman's technical team contributes to an empowered institution where expertise would be fully structurally embedded and archived. When the project is finished, such expertise should be deemed to be no longer dependable on international development partners.</td>
<td>5, 13, 21, 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4/ Complete the work plan with activities prioritising those directly related to INEC’s institutional ownership, self-confidence and professionalism; in particular, action 1.1.3 regarding INEC staff could be reconsidered for the final implementation period.</td>
<td>3, 14, 18, 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5/ When designing specific activities, a priority consideration should be given to the enhancement of INEC’s institutional ownership and consolidation. In other words, support to an activity should as much as possible go beyond logistics and technical support and aim at empowering the INEC and build its institutional capacity. Some mechanisms to assess the effectiveness and impact of the activity would also help to achieve this goal.</td>
<td>10, 14, 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R6/ When ECES contributes to an activity which is cross-cutting with those of another component of the EUSDGN (e.g. meetings with the National Assembly or activities with political parties), ensure that the activity also enhances the capacity of INEC to conduct such an activity autonomously.</td>
<td>10, 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R7/ Consider innovative training formats to address constraints caused by the COVID-19 scenario. In this regard, e-learning programmes with a particular focus</td>
<td>28, 29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
on electoral matters (e.g. ECES Master in Electoral Policy and Administration / MEPA) might be useful for enhancing internal capacities of Nigerian electoral bodies. Particular attention should be paid to recruitment of technical staff with profiles that allow them to fully benefit from the training and to re-invest acquired knowledge in local development tasks. Curricula should be customized to local needs too.

| R8/ | Enhance the capacity of the Electoral Institute with the goal of providing it with the skills and tools for a continuous education policy for INEC staff. A narrower focus on some training topics will also result in more consolidated achievements. | 10, 14, 26 |
| R9/ | Enhance continuous follow-up / tracking procedures able to assess how knowledge and skills spread up by staff training seminars are reflected in daily INEC activities. | 24 |
| R10/ | Enhance continuous follow-up / tracking procedures able to assess to what extent INEC policy documents are implemented in practice. | 24 |
| R11/ | Emphasize the evolution of electoral assistance towards a horizon where INEC would be capable to undertake given activities with no external support (e.g. EMSC). | 14, 25 |
| R12/ | Enhance the accountability of INEC Chairman’s technical team by the production of quarterly reports, as foreseen by the programme. | 21 |
| R13/ | Ensure that the workplan for the remaining years includes the activities planned to support FOSIECON. | 18 |
ANNEX I

TERMS OF REFERENCE (ToR)
TERMS OF REFERENCE
For
ECES INTERNAL MID-TERM EVALUATION
EU Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EU-SDGN) Project
Component 1
ECES Internal Mid-term Evaluation of ‘EU Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EU-SDGN) project – component 1

Contracting Authority: European Centre for Electoral Support

1. BACKGROUND
   1.1 Relevant country / region / sector background
   1.2 Programme to be evaluated
   1.3 Stakeholders of the Action
   1.4 Other available information

2. Description of the action
   2.1 Objectives of the Mid-term Evaluation
   2.2 Requested services
   2.3 Phases of the evaluation and required deliverables
   2.4 Management of the evaluation
   2.5 Language of the specific contract
   2.6 Language of the specific contract

3. EXPERTISE REQUIRED AND ORGANISATION AND METHODOLOGY
   3.1 Number of requested experts per category and number of working days per expert or per category
   3.2 Expertise required
   3.3 Presence of management team for briefing and/or debriefing

4. LOCATION AND DURATION
   4.1 Starting and End period
   4.2 Location(s) of assignment

5. REPORTING
   5.1 Content, timing and submission
   5.2 Comments
   5.3 Language
   5.4 Number of copies
   5.5 Formatting of reports

Annex I: Information that will be provided to the evaluator
Annex II: Structure of the Final Report and of the Executive Summary
1. BACKGROUND

1.1 Relevant country / region / sector background

The EU has consistently in its 10th and 11th EDF National Indicative Programmes put the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria through credible elections as a key element of the respective good governance sector of intervention.

Nigeria over the years has experienced remarkable advancement in electoral governance and citizens’ participation through to the 2015 General Elections. In line with the 2015 European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM)\(^{69}\) recommendations, the European Union with the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) has renewed its commitment to complement the efforts of the Government of Nigeria to improve and strengthen democracy with the objectives foreseen in the EU Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EU-SDGN) project.

The EU Funded Programme “Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria” (EU-SDGN) in the amount of 26.5 million euro is anchored in the priorities of the Nigerian government\(^{70}\) and the 2015 and 2019 European Union Election Observation Missions (EU EOM).

The EU-SDGN programme encompasses five components, which are intrinsically linked to promote the credibility of the electoral process and to strengthen the democracy in Nigeria.

The EU-SDGN component is as follows:

- Component 1: National Electoral Commission support is implemented by the European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES);
- Component 2: The National Assembly support is implemented by the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) and the Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement (YIAGA Africa);
- Component 3: The Political Party Leadership and Policy Development Centre of the National Institute implement the Political Parties support for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS);
- Component 4: The Media, including radio and social media, provides fair, accurate and ethical coverage of the electoral process; the Media support is implemented by the Institute for Media and Society and the International Press Centre (IPC);

The European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES) via a grant contract with the EU, is supporting the implementation of component 1 of the programme through technical assistance to the INEC and other electoral management bodies (SIECs, FOSIECON). Other components implemented by other implementing partners seeks to support the advancement of issues related to the National Assembly, Political Parties, Media, and Civil Society organisations (CSOs) implemented by other partners. Furthermore, there is coordination and collaboration towards implementation of activities as seen in terms of coherence and complementarity with ECES’ support and activities.

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\(^{70}\) The Financing Agreement for this programme was signed on 5 June 2017 by the Ministry of Budget and National Planning of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the European Union for a total amount of 26.5 million euro.
1.2 Programme to be evaluated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of the Programme to be evaluated</th>
<th>EU Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EU-SDGN) project – component 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget to be evaluated</td>
<td>13.000.000 EUR + 5% Co-contribution from ECES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIS numbers of the Actions to be evaluated</td>
<td>European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES) - BE-2010-CEW-1511707062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dates of the Action to be evaluated</td>
<td>2017-2019 at present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The EU is providing 13 million EUR to ECES with an additional contribution of 5% of the total amount from ECES over a 5-year period (2017-2022).

In line with the electoral cycle approach, the (EU-SDGN) project – component 1 covers pre-election, election and post-election activities. The main Key results (KR) are set as outlined below:

1.1 INEC’s strategic planning, policy framework and operational capacity and systems strengthened;
1.2 INEC’s capacity for efficient internal communication and engagement mechanisms with stakeholders enhanced;
1.3 INEC’s periodic voter registration system for a largely clean register of voters significantly improved;
1.4 INEC’s oversight of political parties strengthened;
1.5 INEC’s and political parties’ capacities in Electoral Alternate Dispute Resolution are fostered;
1.6 FOSIECON institutional capacity and collaboration with stakeholders enhanced;

In 2019, a Rider 1 to the EU-SDGN – component 1 was granted to adjust the initial allocation to further support the above expected results described.

It is understood that the focus of this mid-term evaluation is on EU-SDGN – component 1’s performance where the beneficiaries and the EUD expect the most from its findings and lessons learned for adjusting the component 1 at the mid-term period to ensure maximum effectiveness of the action.

1.3 Stakeholders of the Action

The main beneficiaries of the project are the members and staff of the INEC, the Forum of States Independent Electoral Commission of Nigeria (FOSIECON), and State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs) of the 36 constituent states. The final beneficiaries will be Nigerian citizens in general, with a special emphasis on women, youth and marginalized groups such as PWD and IDPs.

1.4 Other available information

ECES is a not for profit private foundation headquartered in Brussels with a global remit. ECES promotes sustainable democratic development through the provision of advisory services, operational support and management of large projects in the electoral and democracy assistance field. ECES works with all electoral stakeholders, including "electoral management bodies, civil society organizations involved in voter education and election

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71 The term ‘Action’ is used throughout the report as a synonym of ‘project and programme’.
observation, political parties, parliaments, media, security forces, religious groups and legal institutions confronted with electoral disputes resolution”.

ECES has crafted and copyrighted its strategy called "A European Response to Electoral Cycle Support - EURECS". This is an innovative and alternative delivery mechanism to implement electoral and democracy assistance activities that are consistent with European values and EU policies and targets the implementations of the recommendations of EU election observation missions and it is built to help prevent, mitigate and manage electoral related conflicts.

EURECS is implemented via specific methodologies and tools developed and also copyrighted by ECES such as its Standard Operation Procedures, the Communication & Visibility Guidelines, the Electoral Political Economy Analyses, the project approach to contribute Preventing Electoral Conflicts and the cascade training curriculum called "Leadership and Conflict Management Skills for Electoral Stakeholders, LEAD"

ECES is also part of a consortium led by the College of Europe to implement the ERMES project (European Response on Mediation Support) to provide a tool for the EU to advance its objectives and role in the field of mediation and dialogue. The project is implemented under the supervision of the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments of the European Commission and in close consultation with the Mediation Support Team of the European External Action Services which will ensure the political steer.

Since February 2010, ECES has signed over 90 contracts in support of transparent, credible and cost-effective electoral processes and the strengthening of democratic institutions in more than 45 countries mainly, but not only, in Africa and Middle East. The EU is by far the largest ECES’ donor, followed by Germany, however ECES has also signed contracts and partnered with many other organizations.

In June 2017, the Delegation of the European Union (EU) to Nigeria via a direct negotiation, awarded ECES the contract for the implementation of the project “EU Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EU-SDGN) – Component 1. This action is implemented in partnership with the INEC.

ECES has developed an internal Monitoring and Knowledge-sharing Strategy (MKS) tailored to the Nigerian context with particular focus on INEC ‘s needs (component 1 of the EU-SDGN).

The internal monitoring reports of the year 1 and 2 have been finalized and shared with the EU Delegation as well as the reports on the project’s expenditures verifications for the first two tranches with ECES awaiting the release of the third tranche.

The EU Delegation has contracted and deployed an external system and financial audit in 2019 whose reports have been finalized including the comments of the EU Delegation and ECES.

As foreseen in the contract signed with the EU Delegation, ECES intended to deploy this internal mid term evaluation in October 2019, however, the EU Delegation requested to postpone the deployment of the selected experts considering the overall evaluation of the five components and of the entire programme that EU Delegation will deploy in 2020.

Sequel to the letter sent by the EU Delegation to ECES on 7 February 2020 and the substitution of three Project Coordinators since June 2017 for different reasons, the ECES Executive Director carried out a mission to Abuja, interacting with the EU Delegation, project team, INEC and EUSDGN partners.
In this context, ECES has proposed to the EU Delegation seven project management solutions. Feedback from the EU Delegation was that a call for applicants be launched in order to consider other candidates, accordingly, ECES has launched this call as requested.

While awaiting the recruitment of another potential Project Coordinator, ECES has indicated that the ECES Executive Director is in charge of the Project Coordination, supported by the Project team and ECES HQ.

In this framework and considering the corona virus crises worldwide, ECES has an urgent need to obtain external views (via teleworking) from evaluators with proven expertise and knowledge of EU project implementation and electoral support to Electoral Management Bodies. ECES seeks to have an urgent report from evaluators that take on board the views of the internal monitoring expert, EU Delegations, beneficiaries and partners. This will also aid the selection of the best Project Coordination set up till June 2022.

Relevant documents under annex II are available and will be shared with the Evaluators. Besides, documents pertaining to instruments for monitoring and evaluation under this project will be made available, for example Project Steering Committee Minutes, Mission Reports, etc.

2 Description of the action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of evaluation</th>
<th>ECES Internal Mid-term Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>EU-SDGN- Component 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic scope</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period to be evaluated</td>
<td>a) Mid-term evaluation – (7 June 2017 – 29 February 2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of the evaluation</td>
<td>23 March 2020 to 24 April 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 Objectives of the Internal Mid-term Evaluation

Systematic and timely evaluation of its programmes and activities is an established priority of the European Commission and by ECES implementing EU funded projects.

The focus of evaluations is on the assessment of achievements, the quality and the results of Actions in the context of an evolving cooperation policy with an increasing emphasis on result-oriented approaches and the contribution towards the implementation of the SDGs.

From this perspective, the mid-term evaluation should look for evidence of why, whether or how these results are linked to the EU intervention and seek to identify the factors driving or hindering progress.

The evaluation should provide an understanding of the cause and effect links between: inputs and activities, and outputs, outcomes and impacts. The evaluation should serve accountability, decision-making, learning and management purposes.

The main objectives of this mid-term evaluation are to provide ECES, the relevant services of the European Union and the interested stakeholders with:

- An overall independent assessment of the past performance of the EU-SDGN Component 1, paying particular attention to ‘intermediate’ and ‘final’ results measured

against its expected objectives; and the reasons underpinning such results;
- Key lessons learned, conclusions and related recommendations in order to improve current and future ECES activities.

In particular, this evaluation will serve to present lessons learned and best practices that may inform on-going activities and future Actions in the field of operations.

2.2 Requested services

2.2.1 Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation will assess the Action using the six standard DAC evaluation criteria, namely: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, and efficiency, potential sustainability and impact. In addition, the evaluation will be based on two ECES specific evaluation criteria:

- the ECES added value (the extent to which the Action adds benefits to what would have resulted from Member States' interventions only);
- The coherence of the Action itself, with the EU strategy in Nigeria and with other EU policies and Member State Actions, and the other most involved donors such as USAID, IFES, DFID, UNDP etc.

The evaluator shall furthermore consider whether the following cross-cutting issues: environmental sustainability, good governance, and human rights were taken into account in the identification/formulation documents and the extent to which they have been reflected in the implementation of the Action and its monitoring. In particular, the evaluator will assess gender mainstream throughout the action and synergies between the different components of the EU-SDGN Programme.

In addition, increasing expectations from EU Member States to maintain development projects to support the democratic governance sector in the European Neighbourhood countries, with increasing budget constraints, puts a spotlight on the notion of value for money (VFM). Therefore, the EU and its partners of implementation are strongly committed to making aid more effective. To some extent, the evaluation is expected to provide analysis on whether the monetary investment and other resources in the interventions conducted by ECES represents sensible value for money, in comparison with previous EU-funded projects in support to democratic process in Nigeria.

The evaluation will assess the Action using the six standard DAC evaluation criteria, namely: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

The evaluation team shall furthermore consider whether the following cross-cutting issues as the promotion of human rights, gender equality, democracy, good governance were taken into account in the formulation documents and the extent to which they have been reflected in the implementation of the Action and its monitoring.

2.2.2 Indicative issues to be studied

The Issues to be addressed as formulated below are indicative. Based on the latter and following initial consultations and document analysis, the evaluator will discuss with the ECES Evaluation Manager and establish a complete and finalised set of Evaluation Questions with indication of specific Judgement Criteria and Indicators, as well as the relevant data collection sources and tools.
The issues to be studied are as follows:

- The extent to which the project responded to the electoral needs;
- The performance of the project arrangements, along the institutional response of the beneficiaries in the delivery of the project's objectives;
- The materialisation of the expected results at national and local level, along its enabling and hindering factors;
- The impact of the ECES support to date with particular focus on the 2019 general elections;
- The lessons learned from the electoral cycles support, and its recommendations for adjusting EU-SDGN component 1 actions.

2.3 Phases of the evaluation and required deliverables

The evaluation process will be carried out in three phases: an Inception Phase, a Field Phase (renamed “Interactive Phase” under current circumstances), and a Synthesis Phase (consolidation of findings). Deliverables should be submitted at the end of the corresponding phases as specified in the synoptic table below. The outputs of each phase are:

2.3.1 Synoptic table

The following table presents an overview of the key activities to be conducted during each phase (not necessarily in chronological order) and lists the deliverables to be produced by the expert, including the key meetings with the Contracting Authority (ECES). The main content of each deliverable is described in Chapter 0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of the evaluation</th>
<th>Key activities</th>
<th>Deliverables and meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Inception Phase**      | • Initial document/data collection, literature review  
                          • Direct engagement with the leadership and management team of the project & initial interviews (conducted either by Skype either through a field visit if it is relevant)  
                          • Definition of methods of analysis  
                          • Background analysis  
                          • Reconstruction (or as necessary, construction) of the Intervention Logic, and/or description of the Theory of Change (based upon available documentation and interviews)  
                          • Methodological design of the evaluation (Evaluation Questions with judgement criteria, indicators and methods of data collection and analysis) and evaluation matrix  | • Virtual kick-off meeting with the ECES and the Reference Group in Abuja (EUD, INEC - (FOSIECON), and (SIECs) representatives  
                          • Evaluation questions; work plan  
                          • Virtual meeting with ECES/EUD Nigeria representatives |
| **Interactive Phase**    | • Virtual meetings at country level with key stakeholders / skype interviews  
                          • Gathering of primary evidence with the use of the most appropriate techniques  
                          • Data collection and analysis  | • Note outlining key findings in bullet points  
                          • Virtual debriefing with ECES/EUD Nigeria representatives |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of the evaluation</th>
<th>Key activities</th>
<th>Deliverables and meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Synthesis phase**    | • Final analysis of findings (with focus on the Evaluation Questions)  
                          • Formulation of the overall assessment, conclusions and recommendations | • Draft Final Report  
                          • Slide presentation |

### 2.3.2 Inception Phase

This phase aims at structuring the evaluation and clarifying its key issues.

The phase will start with initial background study, to be conducted by the evaluators from home. It will then continue with a kick-off Skype conversation with the ECES team (Nigeria), the Reference Group and the evaluators. The conversation aims at arriving at a clear and shared understanding of the scope of the evaluation, its limitations and feasibility. It also serves to clarify expectations regarding evaluation outputs, the methodology to be used and, where necessary, to pass on additional or latest relevant information.

In the Inception phase, the relevant documents will be reviewed (see annex I).

During this phase, the evaluators will review the political, institutional and/or technical/cooperation framework of ECES support to the EU-SDGN component 1 project in the area of electoral reform and governance (including past EU-funded projects).

During the inception phase, the experts will analyse the Intervention Logic of the Action to be evaluated. Furthermore, the evaluators will develop a narrative explanation (Theory of Change) of the logic of the Action that describes how change is expected to happen within the Action, all along its results chain. This explanation includes an assessment of the evidence underpinning this logic (especially between outputs and outcomes, and between outcomes and impact), and articulates the assumptions that must hold for the Action to work, as well as identification of the factors most likely to inhibit the change from happening.

The evaluators will finalise the evaluation methodology, the Evaluation Questions, the definition of judgement criteria and indicators, the selection of data collection tools and sources, and the planning of the following phases. They will also summarise their approach in an Evaluation Design Matrix.

The methodological approach will be represented in an Evaluation Design Matrix. **The methodology of the evaluation should be gender sensitive, contemplate the use of sex- and age-disaggregated data and demonstrate how the project has contributed to progress on gender equality.**

The limitations faced or to be faced during the evaluation exercise will be discussed and mitigation measures defined. Finally, the work plan for the overall evaluation process will be presented and agreed in this phase; this work plan shall be in line with that proposed in the present ToR. Any modifications shall be justified and agreed with ECES Executive Director and/or ECES focal point.

### 2.3.3 Interactive Phase

The Interactive Phase starts after approval of the Evaluation Questions and the work plan by ECES.
The Interactive Phase aims at collecting evidence to the evaluation questions developed during the inception phase.

If any significant deviation from the agreed work plan or schedule is perceived as creating a risk for the quality of the evaluation, these elements are to be immediately discussed with ECES Executive Director or ECES focal point.

In the first days of the interactive phase, the evaluators shall hold a virtual briefing meeting with ECES, the project management, the EU Delegation and relevant stakeholders.

During the interactive phase, the evaluators shall ensure adequate contact and consultation with, and involvement of the different stakeholders; Throughout the mission the evaluators shall use the most reliable and appropriate sources of information, respect the rights of individuals to provide information in confidence, and be sensitive to the beliefs and customs of local social and cultural environments.

At the end of the interactive phase, the evaluators shall summarise its work, analyse the reliability and coverage of data collection, and present preliminary findings in a virtual meeting with ECES Executive Director or focal point and the Reference Group.

2.3.4 Synthesis Phase

This phase is devoted to the preparation of the Final Report and entails the analysis of data collected during the interactive phase to finalise the answers to the Evaluation Questions and prepare the overall assessment, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.

The evaluation experts will present in a single Report which includes Annexes, their findings, conclusions and recommendations in accordance with the agreed structure (see Annex II); a separate Executive Summary will be produced as well.

The evaluation experts will make sure that:

- Their assessment is objective and balanced, statements are accurate and evidence-based, and recommendations realistic.
- When drafting the report, their will acknowledge clearly where changes in the desired direction are known to be already taking place.

The evaluators will deliver and then present the Draft Final Report to ECES to discuss the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations.

ECES focal point consolidates the comments expressed by ECES in liaison with the EUD and the main beneficiaries of the activities and sends them to the evaluators for revision, together with a first version of the Quality Assessment Grid assessing the quality of the Draft Final Report. The content of the Quality Assessment Grid will be discussed with the evaluators to verify if further improvements are required.

The evaluators will then finalise the Final Report and prepare the Executive Summary by addressing the relevant comments. While potential quality issues, factual errors or methodological problems should be corrected, comments linked to diverging judgements may be either accepted or rejected. In the latter instance, the evaluators should explain the reasons in writing.
2.4 Management of the evaluation

2.4.1 At ECES level

The evaluation is managed by ECES in close collaboration with the EUD, the main beneficiary INEC, EUDSGN partners and other electoral assistance providers like IFES etc…

In collaboration with the EU Delegation, ECES is expected to oversee the quality of the process, the evaluation design, the inputs and the deliverables of the evaluation. In particular, it shall:

- Facilitate contacts between the evaluators, the EU services and external stakeholders.
- Ensure that the evaluators have access to and have consulted all relevant information sources and documents related to the Action.
- Define and validate the Evaluation Questions.
- Provide backstopping and quality control of the evaluators work throughout the assignment.
- Validate the agreed deliverables in consultation and agreement with the EU Delegation.

2.5 Language of the specific contract

The language of the specific contract is to be English.

3 EXPERTISE REQUIRED AND ORGANISATION AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Number of requested experts per category and number of working days per expert or per category

3.2 Expertise required

2 key CAT I experts are expected to conduct the evaluation. The minimum requirements of the expert for this contract are as follows.

Minimum requirements of the experts:

Key Expert 1, Category I, Total 20 man/days)

- **University degree:** Advanced university degree in law, political science, international development or related field
- **Professional experience** in the field of elections and/or good governance, evaluation and capacity development. The expert shall have at least 12 years of proven experience in EU funded electoral assistance projects and/or participatory decision-making at different levels of responsibility in the context of EU funded project in support of elections;
- **Specific experience in the field of evaluation of projects preferably in Africa and within EU funding:**
  - Excellent command of both written and spoken English.

Other skills:
- Experience in the identification, formulation, implementation of programmes funded by international donors especially the EU, in the region is an asset;
- Experience in working on electoral assistance or good governance (participatory decision-making processes) issues in the region, especially with the EU funding;
- Experience in EU policies and procedures for internal and external actions will be considered as a strong asset;
- Experience in UN and/or OECD-DAC development agency in the region will be considered an asset.
3.3 Presence of management team for briefing and/or debriefing

The presence of member(s) of the ECES representatives, INEC and EUD is required for briefing or debriefing purposes.

4 LOCATION AND DURATION

4.1 Starting and End period

Provisional start and end of the assignment: 16th March – 8th May 2020.

Maximum duration of the assignment: 8 working days for the inception phase, 8 working days for the interactive phase and 8 days writing the report (including time for finalising the final report) for each Expert.

It is assumed that the consultants will work on the basis of a five-day week.

4.2 Location(s) of assignment

The assignment will entail home-base work and Skype (or other means to hold virtual meetings) with ECES HQ in Brussels, the field office and other stakeholders in Abuja, Nigeria.

5 REPORTING

5.1 Content, timing and submission

The reports must match quality standards. The text of the report should be illustrated, as appropriate, with maps, graphs and tables; a map of the area(s) of Action is required (to be attached as Annex).

The evaluator will submit the following documents and reports:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Pages (excluding annexes)</th>
<th>Main Content</th>
<th>Timing for submission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation questions; workplan</td>
<td>• Evaluation Questions, judgement criteria and indicators</td>
<td>30 March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Work plan (Stakeholder map, brief analysis of risks and mitigating measures/brief methodological approach)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft Final Report</td>
<td>20/25 pages maximum (plus annexes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Executive Summary</td>
<td>End of Synthesis Phase by the 10 of April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Introduction</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Methodology (includes: Intervention logic incl. a reconstruction of the intervention logic and spelling out the theory of change)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Pages (excluding annexes)</td>
<td>Main Content</td>
<td>Timing for submission</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
|                                     | • Methodology for the evaluation; Evaluation Questions; judgement criteria and indicators; Evaluation Matrix; Data analysis and collection methods; Work plan; Stakeholder map; Analysis of risks and of mitigating measures)  
• Answered questions / Findings  
• Overall assessment (optional)  
• Conclusions and Recommendations  
• Annexes to the report |                                     | 24 April 2020 |
| Executive Summary 2/3 pages         | Short. It should focus on the key purpose or issues of the evaluation, outline the main analytical points, and clearly indicate the main conclusions, lessons to be learned and specific recommendations. |                                       |
| Final report 25/30 pages maximum (plus annexes) | • Same specifications as of the Draft Final Report, incorporating any comments received from the concerned parties on the draft report that have been accepted | 24th April 2020 |

5.2 Comments

For each document and report, ECES, and the EU Delegation focal points will submit comments within 7 calendar days. The revised reports incorporating comments received from the ECES shall be submitted within 3 weeks from the date of receipt of the comments. The evaluators should provide a separate document (a comments sheet) explaining how and where comments have been integrated or the reason for non-integration of certain comments.

5.3 Language

All reports shall be submitted in English.

5.4 Number of copies

The final version of the Final Report will be provided in 4 paper copies and electronic versions in PDF and MS WORD formats.

5.5 Formatting of reports

All reports will be produced using Font Arial minimum 11, single spacing. The draft report will use consecutive numbers for the paragraphs for easier commenting. These will be removed in the final draft of the report.
ANNEXES

Annex I: Information that will be provided to the evaluator

- Legal texts and political commitments pertaining to the Action to be evaluated
- Country Strategy Paper Nigeria and Indicative Programmes (and equivalent) for the periods covered
- Relevant national / sector policies and plans from National and Local partners and other donors
- Action identification studies
- Action feasibility / formulation studies
- Action financing agreement and addenda
- Action narrative reports, and technical reports
- Relevant documentation from national/local partners and other donors
- Relevant documentation about past EU-funded projects in support to democratic reform processes in Nigeria
- Action’ social media and websites
- Minutes of EU-SDGN Project Technical Committee meeting and minutes of ECES staff meetings
- Any other relevant document

Note: The evaluators have to identify and obtain any other document worth analysing, through independent research and during interviews with relevant informed parties and stakeholders of the Action.
Annex II: Structure of the Final Report and of the Executive Summary

The evaluator is requested to deliver two distinct documents: The Final Report and the Executive Summary within the 24th of April 2020 with starting on the 23rd of April 2020. A first Draft Report is expected by April 10th 2020.

Additional information on the overall context of the Action, description of methodology and analysis of findings should be reported in an Annex to the main text.

Executive Summary
A tightly-drafted, to-the-point and free-standing Executive Summary. It should be short, no more than two to three pages. It should focus on the key purpose or issues of the evaluation, outline the main analytical points, and clearly indicate the main conclusions, lessons to be learned and specific recommendations.

The main sections of the evaluation report shall be as follows:

1. Introduction
A description of the Action, of the relevant country/region/sector background and of the evaluation, providing the reader with sufficient methodological explanations to gauge the credibility of the conclusions and to acknowledge limitations or weaknesses, where relevant.

2. Methodology
Summary of the Methodology for the evaluation; Evaluation Questions; judgement criteria and indicators; Evaluation Matrix; Data analysis and collection methods; Work plan; Stakeholder map; Analysis of risks and of mitigating measures

3. Answered questions / Findings
A chapter presenting the Evaluation Questions and conclusive answers, together with evidence and reasoning.

4. Overall assessment (optional)
A chapter synthesising all answers to Evaluation Questions into an overall assessment of the Action. The detailed structure of the overall assessment should be refined during the evaluation process. The relevant chapter has to articulate all the findings, conclusions and lessons in a way that reflects their importance and facilitates the reading. The structure should not follow the Evaluation Questions, the logical framework or the evaluation criteria.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Conclusions
This chapter contains the conclusions of the evaluation, organised per evaluation criterion. A paragraph or sub-chapter should pick up the 3 or 4 major conclusions organised by order of importance, while avoiding being repetitive. This practice allows better communication of the evaluation messages. If possible, the evaluation report identifies one or more transferable lessons, which are highlighted in the executive summary and can be presented in appropriate seminars or other dissemination activities.
5.2 Recommendations

They are intended to improve or reform the Action in the framework of the cycle under way. Recommendations must be clustered and prioritised, carefully targeted to the appropriate audiences at all levels, especially within the Commission structure.

6. Annexes to the report

The report should include the following annexes:

- The Terms of Reference of the evaluation;
- The name/s of the evaluator (CV/s should be shown, but summarised and limited to one page);
- Detailed evaluation methodology including: options taken, difficulties encountered and limitations. Detail of tools and analyses;
- Evaluation Matrix;
- Intervention logic / Logical Framework matrices (planned/real and improved/updated);
- Relevant geographic map(s) where the Action took place;
- List of persons/organisations consulted;
- Literature and documentation consulted;
- Other technical annexes (e.g. statistical analyses, tables of contents and figures, matrix of evidence, databases) as relevant;
- Detailed answer to the Evaluation Questions, judgement criteria and indicators.
ANNEX II – Biographies and CVs of the evaluators

Jordi BARRAT I ESTEVE

Jordi Barrat I Esteve (Reus, 1968) holds a PhD in constitutional law from the University of Leon (1997) and a Law Degree from the University of Navarre (1986-1991). He serves as a professor of constitutional law at the University Rovira I Virgili / URV and had similar positions at the universities of Navarre, Alacant and Leon. He was also Deputy of the Catalan Office for the Quality of Democracy (2013 / 2014). He completed academic stages in Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia and Peru. His research focuses the legal framework of new voting technologies and he has provided consultancies for different international organizations (e.g.: Council of Europa, European Union, OSCE/ODIHR, IDEA, IFES, OAS, A-WEB, The Carter Center and ECES).

Christian JOLY

Christian Joly is currently an independent expert in the fields of elections, reform of State institutions and governance. Christian holds a PhD in law and a degree in politics from University of Aix-Marseille, France. Until 2004 he pursued an academic career during which he taught, among others, constitutional law, EU law, international relations, including within programs on humanitarian action and international observation, and comparative political systems. From 1997 to 2004 Christian got involved in international academic exchanges, as Head of the international office of an academic institution and has taught in numerous universities, particularly in central Europe. In 2004 Christian join the French diplomatic service and was posted first in Washington DC and then Ghana. In Washington he was first in charge of the relations with civil society organizations, think tanks and foundations, and then of the academic cooperation between France and the United States; in Accra, Ghana, he was in charge of governance. He then joined the European Union in 2013 and was successively Head of the political section of the EU Delegation in Burundi from 2013 to 2017 before holding the same position in Afghanistan until August 2019.
1. Family name **BARRAT**  
2. First name **Jordi**

3. Date of birth 4th April 1968  
4. Nationality (passport holder) **Spain**  
5. Place of residence **Reus (Spain)**  
6. E-mail **jordi.barrat[at]gmail.com**  
7. Phone + 34 630 74 59 12  
8. **Skype jordibarrat**

8. **Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTION [DATE FROM - DATE TO]</th>
<th>DEGREE(S) OR DIPLOMA(S) OBTAINED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| EODS (Election Observation and Democratic Support) | Methodological and Organizational Challenges to European Union Election Observation [April 2017]  
Advanced Training on Voter Registration, Biometrics and Election Administration [November 2015] |
| University of Leon (Spain) [1991 - 1997] | PhD Constitutional Law |
| University of Navarre (Spain) [1986 - 1991] | Law Degree |

9. **Language skills: CEFR levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LANGUAGE</th>
<th>READING</th>
<th>SPEAKING</th>
<th>WRITING</th>
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<tr>
<td>Catalan</td>
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<td>Mother tongue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

10. **Present position** **Professor of Constitutional Law (University Rovira Virgili, Spain)**

11. **Years of professional experience:** **28**

12. **Key qualifications**

- Expert on constitutional issues for international institutions (e.g. EU, CoE, OSCE/ODIHR, IDEA, OAS, IFES, A-Web, ECES, The Carter Center);
- Experience as constitutional expert in 19 countries: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Bolivia, Costa Rica, DR Congo, El Salvador, France, North Macedonia, Mexico, Honduras, Gabon, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Norway, Peru and Sri Lanka.
- Research focused on election law and new voting technologies
- Experience in public administration and governance field: Deputy Director Office for the Quality of Democracy / Government of Catalonia; Deputy Director Mexican Regional Ombuds Person
- Involved in training issues for electoral assistance programs (i.e., content development, training delivering, evaluation, follow-up adult learning programs, e-learning methodologies);
- Member of the Ad hoc Committee of Experts on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting (CAHVE) / Council of Europe (2015-2016). Leading drafter (rapporteur): Council of Europe / E-voting certification guidelines
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<td>Responsibilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Electoral Analyst</td>
<td>Assessing the Mexican legislation on electoral administration, observing electoral procedures, reporting to the Core Team with preliminary/final documents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Short Term Observer</td>
<td>Preliminary training on observation methodology, observing the implementation of Honduran voting machines, final reporting on electoral procedures during the election day.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Project Evaluator</td>
<td>Final external evaluation of the project, reporting to stakeholders, assessing pertinence, efficacity, efficiency, impact and sustainability.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Constitutional &amp; Voting Expert</td>
<td>Assessing the Honduran legislation on voting procedures, observing the implementation of Honduran voting machines, assessing Honduran constitutional issues (presidential election).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Capacity Building Expert</td>
<td>Assessment of the needs on election training for local election observation, development of election curricula and recruitment strategy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Analyst</td>
<td>Observing the Mexican legislation on electoral administration, providing input to the Core Team with preliminary/final reports.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Start</td>
<td>End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Expert</td>
<td>Comprehensive Study of OCV methods</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>April 2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law &amp; Voting Expert</td>
<td>Legal Assessment of the Mexican Voter Registration System</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>November 2015 - July 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voting Expert</td>
<td>Legal Assessment of the INE's Electoral Law</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>October 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead Election Observer</td>
<td>Legal Assessment of the INE's Electoral Law</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>October 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead Election Observer</td>
<td>Legal Assessment of the INE's Electoral Law</td>
<td>FYRO Macedonia</td>
<td>December 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Building Expert</td>
<td>Legal Assessment of the INE's Electoral Law</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>October 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Building Expert</td>
<td>Legal Assessment of the INE's Electoral Law</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>December 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Role</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Beata Martin-Rozumilowicz</td>
<td>OSCE / ODIHR</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>December 2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal analyst (national staff)</td>
<td>Election Assessment Mission (EAM) / ODIHR</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>December 2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Peter Wolf</td>
<td>International IDEA</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>February 2015 - March 2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Ana Rusu</td>
<td>Council of Europe (CoE)</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>February 2015 - August 2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election training expert</td>
<td>Election Training Programme / Centre for Continuous Electoral Training (CET)</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>February 2015 - August 2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert on Voter Registration</td>
<td>Electoral Assistance / OAS</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>April 2015 - May 2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The table above summarizes the roles and responsibilities of various individuals involved in electoral processes across different regions and organizations.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Department/Unit</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 2015</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td><a href="mailto:MMellenkamp@oas.org">MMellenkamp@oas.org</a></td>
<td>Ms. Maria Mellenkamp</td>
<td>STO / EOM Election Observation Mission / OAS</td>
<td>Preliminary training on observation methodology, participation in observation, monitoring advanced research (seminars, reports, consultation), leadership and coordination of a team of 6 researchers and observers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004 – 2018</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>R&amp;D&amp;I Unit / Government of Spain</td>
<td>Ms. Marta Garcia</td>
<td>Team Leader, ICT &amp; Elections</td>
<td>Leadership and coordination of a team of 6 researchers and consultants, promoting technical assistance on election procedures, providing in-depth information on good practices, leadership and coordination of a team of 12 civil servants, promoting advanced research (seminars, reports, consultation), leadership and coordination of a team of 6 researchers and observers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2013 – November 2013</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Office for the Quality of Democracy / Government of Catalonia</td>
<td>Mr. Miquel Puig</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>Leadership and coordination of a team of 13 civil servants, establishing joint cooperation with local administrations and civil society initiatives, democratic law reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2015</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Election Observation Team</td>
<td>Ms. Maria Mellenkamp</td>
<td>OAS / EOM Observer Mission / EOM</td>
<td>Participation in observation, monitoring advanced research (seminars, reports, consultation), leadership and coordination of a team of 6 researchers and observers, preliminary training on observation methodology, participation in observation, monitoring advanced research (seminars, reports, consultation), leadership and coordination of a team of 6 researchers and observers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Dates</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
<td>Mr. Josep Ramon Fuentes</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>May 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
<td>Ms. Maria Mellenkamp</td>
<td><a href="mailto:MMellenkamp@oas.org">MMellenkamp@oas.org</a></td>
<td>June 2012 – July 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Mr. Raul Cordenillo</td>
<td><a href="mailto:R.Cordenillo@idea.int">R.Cordenillo@idea.int</a></td>
<td>October 2009 – December 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Council of Europe (CoE)</td>
<td>Mr. Michael Remmert</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Michael.REMMERT@coe.int">Michael.REMMERT@coe.int</a></td>
<td>October 2010 – June 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>University Rovira i Virgili (URV)</td>
<td>Mr. Josep Ramon Fuentes</td>
<td><a href="mailto:josepmon.fuentes@urv.cat">josepmon.fuentes@urv.cat</a></td>
<td>2010 – 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Honduras**
- Providing legal advice on electoral good practices

**Mexico**
- Providing legal advice on electoral good practices

**Norway**
- Providing legal advice on electoral good practices

**France**
- Providing legal advice on electoral good practices

**Spain**
- Providing legal advice on electoral good practices
<p>| Position                                      | Professor | Mexico                          | Mexico                          | Belgium                        | France                         | Belgium                        | France                         | Mexico                          | Mexico                          | Belgium                        | France                         | Belgium                        | France                         | Mexico                          | Mexico                          | Belgium                        |
|----------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 1991 – December 1992</td>
<td>Spain University of Leon</td>
<td>Ms. Juan Andres Muñoz</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Juanandes.munoz@unileon.es">Juanandes.munoz@unileon.es</a>&lt;br&gt;Research and teaching within the Public Law Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1991 – December 1992</td>
<td>Spain University of Navarre</td>
<td>Ms. Juan Andres Muñoz</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Juanandes.munoz@unirioja.es">Juanandes.munoz@unirioja.es</a>&lt;br&gt;Research and teaching within the Public Law Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2007 – December 1992</td>
<td>Spain University of Leon</td>
<td>Mr. Manuel B. Garcia</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Mr.mbagara@unileon.es">Mr.mbagara@unileon.es</a>&lt;br&gt;Research and teaching within the Public Law Department.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Curriculum Vitae

1. **Family name:** JOLY
2. First names: Christian
3. Date of birth: 06/09/1952
4. Nationality: French
5. Civil status: Married
6. Education:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTION AND YEAR OF DEGREE</th>
<th>DEGREE(S) OR DIPLOMA(S) OBTAINED:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976 - Institute of Political Studies of Aix-en-Provence</td>
<td>Degree of Political Studies (Sciences Po)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 - Paul Cézanne University (Aix-Marseille III)</td>
<td>PhD in Law Thesi: United Kingdom and Community Cooperation for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 - Paul Cézanne University (Aix-Marseille III)</td>
<td>Master’s degree (DEA) in Public Law:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **Language skills:** Indicate competence on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 - excellent; 5 - basic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LANGUAGE</th>
<th>READING</th>
<th>SPEAKING</th>
<th>WRITING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. **Other skills:** (e.g. Computer literacy, etc.)
   - Usual knowledge of computer tools

9. **Present position:** Independent Expert
10. **Key qualifications:** (Relevant to the project)
   a) **International experience**

   Work and living experience in several different countries (Morocco, UK, USA, Ghana, Burundi, Afghanistan) ; strong diplomatic experience and work for the European Union in delegations; work in a crisis environment; work and trainings given in a multicultural environment; representation of France and EU in official meetings; development of partnerships.

   b) **Project management**
International project development and management; programming, identification, formulation and following of projects and coordination between international actors; guidance in the execution of all operational activities; policy dialogue management between government and donors; intercultural exchanges and international relations management; team animation and management; good knowledge of the main IT tools; press and media relations.

c) Knowledge of EU tools and democratic related issues

Good knowledge and experience in diplomacy and international cooperation tools along with analytical skills; economic and social development issues as well as humanitarian international actions; programming tools (EDF); democratic governance related issues, as well as reform of state and electoral processes; mechanisms for budgetary support; Human Rights and support to Human Rights Defenders; European Union procedures and programs.

d) Instruction and training

Strong experience in teaching in a multicultural environment.

11. Specific experience in the region:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>DATE FROM - DATE TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2017-2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2013-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1976-1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE FROM</td>
<td>DATE TO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2017</td>
<td>August 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2013</td>
<td>August 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2009</td>
<td>August 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>August 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>September 2007</td>
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</table>
• Publications

13. Other Relevant Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOMES / INTERVENTION LOGIC COMPONENT 1 EU-SDGN</th>
<th>EVALUATION MATRIX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.4.2 - Project activities to be adapted to unexpected changes on election calendar</td>
<td>1.4 - Specific Nigerian timeframe (i.e. electoral cycle) taken into consideration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.1 - Project planning to be aligned to Nigerian electoral cycle needs</td>
<td>1.4.1 - Specific Nigerian timeframe (i.e. electoral cycle) taken into consideration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1 - INEC (HQ &amp; Regional branches), SIEC and FOSIECOM actual involvement in joint project implementations (ministries, interviews, liaison officers)</td>
<td>1.3.2 - INEC communication / outreach strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.3 - Cross-cutting topics (e.g. PWD, gender) addressed with specific measures and actions</td>
<td>1.3 - INEC communication / outreach strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2 - INEC communication / outreach strategy</td>
<td>1.2 - Measured against to actual outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2 - Assessments on local stakeholders (i.e. CSO) actual capacity</td>
<td>1.2 - Measured against to actual outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 - INEC institutional capacity assessments (methodology, reporting and update)</td>
<td>1.2 - Measured against to actual outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 - INEC institutional capacity assessments (methodology, reporting and update)</td>
<td>1.2 - Measured against to actual outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.3 - Cross-cutting topics (i.e. PWD, gender) addressed with specific measures and actions</td>
<td>1.3.3 - Cross-cutting topics (i.e. PWD, gender) addressed with specific measures and actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2 - INEC communication / outreach strategy</td>
<td>1.3.2 - INEC communication / outreach strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1 - INEC (HQ &amp; Regional branches), SIEC and FOSIECOM actual involvement in joint project implementations (ministries, interviews, liaison officers)</td>
<td>1.3.1 - INEC (HQ &amp; Regional branches), SIEC and FOSIECOM actual involvement in joint project implementations (ministries, interviews, liaison officers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3 - Quality of project operational planning</td>
<td>1.2.3 - Quality of project operational planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 - INEC institutional capacity assessments (methodology, reporting and update)</td>
<td>1.2.1 - INEC institutional capacity assessments (methodology, reporting and update)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 - INEC institutional capacity assessments (methodology, reporting and update)</td>
<td>1.2 - INEC institutional capacity assessments (methodology, reporting and update)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3 - Regional / local approach (i.e. SIEC, FOSIECON, Regional CSOs) strategy and actions</td>
<td>1.1.3 - Regional / local approach (i.e. SIEC, FOSIECON, Regional CSOs) strategy and actions</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1.2 - Updating methodology (assessments and implementation)</td>
<td>1.1.2 - Updating methodology (assessments and implementation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2.2 - Assessments on local stakeholders (i.e. CSO) actual capacity</td>
<td>1.2.2 - Assessments on local stakeholders (i.e. CSO) actual capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 - INEC institutional capacity assessments (methodology, reporting and update)</td>
<td>1.2.1 - INEC institutional capacity assessments (methodology, reporting and update)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1.1.2 - Actual needs of beneficiaries assessed and addressed</td>
<td>1.1.1.2 - Actual needs of beneficiaries assessed and addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1.1 - Assessments made by project inception reports / kick-off meetings</td>
<td>1.1.1.1 - Assessments made by project inception reports / kick-off meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1 - Actual needs of beneficiaries assessed and addressed</td>
<td>1.1.1 - Actual needs of beneficiaries assessed and addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2 - INEC strategy planning policy</td>
<td>1.1.2 - INEC strategy planning policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3 - INEC actual involvement in joint project implementations (minutes, interviews, liaison officers)</td>
<td>1.1.3 - INEC actual involvement in joint project implementations (minutes, interviews, liaison officers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 - INEC National Communication is strengthened and operational capacity are framework and operational capacity are strengthened</td>
<td>1.1 - INEC National Communication is strengthened and operational capacity are framework and operational capacity are strengthened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.2 - Project activities to be adapted to unexpected changes on election calendar</td>
<td>1.4.2 - Project activities to be adapted to unexpected changes on election calendar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.1 - Project planning to be aligned to Nigerian electoral cycle needs</td>
<td>1.4.1 - Project planning to be aligned to Nigerian electoral cycle needs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ARTICLE III - EVALUATION MATRIX**
## Coherence

To what extent compatibility (i.e. complementarity, consistency and coordination) exists with other activities in a given country, sector or institution?

### EU-SDGN Component Outputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality control and Means of Verification</th>
<th>Indicators &amp; Questions</th>
<th>EU-SDGN Component Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1 – Specific references to EU EOM 2015</td>
<td>2.1.1 – Specific references to EU EOM 2015</td>
<td>2.1.1 – Meaningful intervention logic derived from EU EOM 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2 – Updates implemented from EEM and EU EOM 2019</td>
<td>2.1.2 – Updates implemented from EEM and EU EOM 2019</td>
<td>2.1.2 – Updates implemented from EEM and EU EOM 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 – Communication protocols with other EU-SDGN components</td>
<td>2.2.1 – Communication protocols with other EU-SDGN components</td>
<td>2.2.1 – Communication protocols with other EU-SDGN components</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2.2 – Coordination procedures with other EU-SDGN components</td>
<td>2.2.2 – Coordination procedures with other EU-SDGN components</td>
<td>2.2.2 – Coordination procedures with other EU-SDGN components</td>
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<td>2.3.1 – Election-related international donors</td>
<td>2.3.1 – Election-related international donors</td>
<td>2.3.1 – Election-related international donors</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3.2 – Election-related international partners</td>
<td>2.3.2 – Election-related international partners</td>
<td>2.3.2 – Election-related international partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1 – Meaningful intervention logic for ECES role vis-à-vis local election-related actors</td>
<td>2.4.1 – Meaningful intervention logic for ECES role vis-à-vis local election-related actors</td>
<td>2.4.1 – Meaningful intervention logic for ECES role vis-à-vis local election-related actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2 – Adaptability of EU-SDGN Component 1 to new interventions</td>
<td>2.4.2 – Adaptability of EU-SDGN Component 1 to new interventions</td>
<td>2.4.2 – Adaptability of EU-SDGN Component 1 to new interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.3 – Civil society aligned to project priorities</td>
<td>2.4.3 – Civil society aligned to project priorities</td>
<td>2.4.3 – Civil society aligned to project priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.1 – Local stakeholders involved in ECES</td>
<td>2.5.1 – Local stakeholders involved in ECES</td>
<td>2.5.1 – Local stakeholders involved in ECES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.2 – Local stakeholders involved in INEC</td>
<td>2.5.2 – Local stakeholders involved in INEC</td>
<td>2.5.2 – Local stakeholders involved in INEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.3 – Enhanced and strengthened communication and coordination among INEC</td>
<td>2.5.3 – Enhanced and strengthened communication and coordination among INEC</td>
<td>2.5.3 – Enhanced and strengthened communication and coordination among INEC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Outcomes / Intervention Logic Component 1 EU-SDGN

1.1. Effective mechanisms for internal functioning of INEC

1.2. INEC’s periodic voter registration is strengthened and mechanisms to engage with stakeholders are strengthened

1.3. INEC’s internal accountability – Ensure accountability and responsibility of all INEC staff in the conduct of 2019 elections

1.4. INEC’s legal capacities and Alternative Electoral Dispute Resolution strengthened

1.5. INEC’s institutional capacity and collaboration with stakeholders enhanced and collaboration with stakeholders strengthened

1.6. INEC’s institutional capacity and Alternative Electoral Dispute Resolution strengthened

1.7. INEC’s internal accountability – Ensure accountability and responsibility of all INEC staff in the conduct of 2019 elections
3. Effectiveness

To what extent has the intervention achieved its intermediary results and contributed to improving INEC management of the 2019 elections?

To what extent has it contributed to fostering INEC’s capacities towards its stakeholders, voters, political parties?

**Outcomes component 1 / Intervention Logic EU - SDGN**

1.1. Effective mechanisms for internal functioning of INEC
1.2. Strengthened capacities of INEC’s staff and the improved management system
1.3. Electoral processes are owned by all civil society
1.4. INEC’s internal accountability – Ensure accountability and responsibility of all INEC staff in the conduct of 2019 General Elections
1.5. Legitimisation of an electoral process by an enhanced credibility of INEC

**EU-SDGN Component 1 Outcomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality control and Means of Verification</th>
<th>Indicators &amp; Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1: Ratio of number of activities planned to number of activities conducted</td>
<td>Indicator 2: The progress/benefit of each output compared to plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EU-SDGN Intervention Log EU-SDGN**

1.1. Effective mechanisms for internal functioning of INEC
1.2. Strengthened capacities of INEC’s staff and the improved management system
1.3. Electoral processes are owned by all civil society
1.4. INEC’s internal accountability – Ensure accountability and responsibility of all INEC staff in the conduct of 2019 General Elections
1.5. Legitimisation of an electoral process by an enhanced credibility of INEC
### 4. Efficiency
To what extent the intervention delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in a cost-efficient and timely way?

#### 4.1 Quarter of planning in terms of instruments, policies, and measures

- 4.1.1 Quality of planning
- 4.1.2 Flow approaches for project activities
- 4.1.3 Cross-indicator activities of EU-SDGN component 1
- 4.1.4 EEC coordination mechanisms
- 4.1.5 Procurement indicators

#### 4.2 Distributions of tasks / Internal coordination

- 4.2.1 INEC & ECES coordination mechanisms
- 4.2.2 INEC & ECES coordination mechanisms
- 4.2.3 Flow approaches for project activities
- 4.2.4 INEC & ECES coordination mechanisms

#### 4.3 Implementation

- 4.3.1 Timely implementation
- 4.3.2 Availability of indicators
- 4.3.3 Inception profile of the contractor (i.e., non-profit / profit entity)
- 4.3.4 Institutional profile of the contractor (i.e., non-profit / profit entity)
- 4.3.5 Procurement indicators

### EU-SDGN Outputs

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<td>4.4.5 Human resources management</td>
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**4.1** INEC's internal accountability – Ensure accountability and responsibility of INEC staff and the improved management system

**4.2** Strengthened capacities of INEC staff and the improved management system

**4.3** Electoral processes are conducted by all civil society

**4.4** INEC's internal coordination is strengthened

**4.5** INEC process is enhanced credibly of INEC
**5. Impact**

To what extent the ECES support to INEC has already brought some changes which can be measured against the 2019 elections?

**Outcomes component 1 / Intervention Logic EU**

1.1. Effective mechanisms for internal functioning of INEC

1.2. Strengthened capacities of INEC’s staff and the improved management system

1.3. Electoral processes are owned by all civil society

1.4. INEC’s internal accountability – Ensure accountability and responsibility of all INEC staff in the conduct of 2019 General elections (prevention of electoral fraud). INEC should be held accountable for any malpractices observed during the conduct of elections.

1.5. Legitimisation of electoral process by an enhanced credibility of INEC

**EU-SDGN Component 1 Outputs**

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<td>5.1. INEC has acquired an improved planning, policy and operational capacity demonstrated in 2019 general elections [detailed questions will consider particularly the impact of 1/ the provision of high level technical and electoral advisory experts, 2/ the support to EMSC]</td>
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<td>5.2. Following 2019 elections, have corrective measures been taken within INEC in line with 2015 and 2019 EUEOM, EEM and EFM recommendations?</td>
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<td>5.3. Political parties comply more effectively with laws and INEC recommendations</td>
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<td>5.4. On key milestones of the electoral process (postponement of elections, E-Day, announcement of preliminary results) coordination with media allowed on-time, complete and accurate dissemination of information to the voters.</td>
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<td>5.5. INEC is proactive in responding to hate speech and fake news</td>
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5.6. Participation of women in elections (voters, electoral agents and candidates) is improved (baseline 2015 elections).

5.7. INEC tracks and investigates all internal electoral offences.

**5.1. Report of the 2019 EUEOM**

**5.2. CSOs observation reports (ViGA) / Reports of high level technical and electoral advisory experts / EMSC reporting tools / Reports of INEC’s periodic voter registration system for a largely clean voter register is supported**

5.3. INEC’s Institutional capacity and collaboration with stakeholders enhanced with strengthened and institutional mechanisms to engage with stakeholders.
6. Sustainability

To what extent the actions are bringing transformations which are likely to be upheld without donor’s support?

Outcomes component 1 / Intervention Logic EU-SDGN

1.1. Effective mechanisms for internal functioning of INEC

1.2. Strengthened capacities of INEC’s staff and the improved management system

1.3. Electoral processes are owned by all civil society

1.4. INEC’s internal accountability – Ensure accountability and responsibility of all INEC staff in the conduct of 2019 General elections

6.1. The relevant authorities have taken the financial measure(s) to ensure the continuation of INEC enhanced capacities after the end of the ECES activities

6.2. INEC’s periodic voter registration system for a largely clean voter register is strengthened

6.3. INEC’s internal accountability – Ensure accountability and responsibility of all INEC staff in the conduct of 2019 General elections

6.4. INEC’s strategic planning, policy framework and operational capacity are strengthened

6.5. Legitimization of an electoral process by enshrining credibility of INEC

6.6. INEC’s internal accountability – Ensure accountability and responsibility of all INEC staff in the conduct of 2019 General elections

Quality control and Means of Verification

Indicators & Questions

1.1 INEC’s strategic planning, policy framework and operational capacity are strengthened

1.2 INEC’s periodic voter registration system for a largely clean voter register is strengthened

1.3 INEC’s internal accountability – Ensure accountability and responsibility of all INEC staff in the conduct of 2019 General elections

1.4 INEC’s internal accountability – Ensure accountability and responsibility of all INEC staff in the conduct of 2019 General elections

1.5 FOSIECON’s institutional capacity and collaboration with stakeholders enhanced

1.6 INEC’s institutional capacity and collaboration with stakeholders enhanced

1.7 INEC’s institutional capacity and collaboration with stakeholders enhanced

1.8 INEC’s institutional capacity and collaboration with stakeholders enhanced
### Outcomes / Intervention logic Component 1: EU-SDGN

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### Dispute Resolution

- **1.5** ECES profile
- **1.4** ECES internal communication is strengthened and the institutional framework and operational capacity are enhanced
- **1.3** ECES monitoring system for a reliably clean voter register
- **1.2** ECES internal accountability processes are strengthened and the institutional framework and operational capacity are enhanced
- **1.1** ECES institutional capacity and collaboration with stakeholders

### Conclusion

To what extent ECES involvement results in improvements compared to previous and current implementations?
ANNEX V - List of persons / organizations consulted

ECES
1. Fabio Bargiacchi
2. Monica Frassoni
3. Dominique Weerts
4. David Le Notre
5. Rudolf Elbling
6. Maria-Teresa Mauro
7. Sylvestre Somo
8. Hajer Mhedhbi
9. Isiaka Yahaya
10. Wilson Manji
11. Jose Lambiza
12. Florence Burban

European Union Delegation to Nigeria
13. Ketil Karlson – Ambassador, Head of Delegation
14. Kurt Cornelis – Head of Cooperation
15. Laolu Olawumi – Programme Manager, Democracy, Governance and Migration

Elections Missions
17. Renata Tardioli, Expert, EU EEM Nigeria 2018

Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC)
19. May Agbamuche-Mbu – Hon. National Commissioner, I/C Legal Services
22. Prof. Bolade Eyinla – Chief Technical Advisor to the Chair
23. Prof. Muhammad Kuna Special Adviser to the Chair
24. Rotimi Oyekanmi – Chief Press Secretary to the Chair
25. Oluwole Osaze-Uzzi – Director, Voter Education, Gender and CSO Liaison
26. Mariam Musa – Director — Commission’s Secretariat
27. Samson Fadare – EMSC Consultant
28. Sa’ad Umar Idris – Director, The Electoral Institute (TEI) / Director Training

EU-SDGN partners (Representatives of the following organizations) Implementers of components 2 to 5 of EU SDGN

29. Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC)
30. Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement (YIAGA Africa)
31. National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies – Political Parties Leadership Development (NIPSS)
32. International Press Centre (IPC)
33. BC Media Action
34. CLEEN Foundation
35. Nigerian Women Trust Fund
36. The Albino Foundation
37. Westminster Foundation for Democracy
38. International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
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35. ECES, ToR for Senior Project Officer, EU SDGN Component 1
36. ECES, ToR for Electoral administration expert, EU SDGN Component 1